Ama should have left faa alone!
#101
Here's the NTSB's determination. Unfortunately, I think that no matter what, the model pilot has the requirement to avoid full scale. The NTSB determination would seem to support that view.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSB Identification: CEN10LA487
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, August 14, 2010 in Brighton, CO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/19/2011
Aircraft: SHPAKOW THOMAS SA 750, registration: N28KT
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
During a local fly-in event, a radio controlled airplane collided with a bi-plane while the bi-plane was performing a go-around. The radio controlled airplane was performing a hover maneuver just prior to the collision and initiated an escape maneuver which placed the radio controlled airplane right into the flight path of the bi-plane. The bi-plane sustained substantial damage, but was able to land without further incident. The radio controlled airplane was destroyed. Prior to the event, the event coordinator briefed the participants that they were to operate their radio controlled airplanes to the east of the runway, and not directly in the runway environment. While the event coordinator was monitoring the radio for traffic, it was not clearly communicated who, if anyone, was providing spotter duties for the radio controlled airplane operator prior to the collision.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.av...no=8&pgsize=50
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSB Identification: CEN10LA487
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, August 14, 2010 in Brighton, CO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/19/2011
Aircraft: SHPAKOW THOMAS SA 750, registration: N28KT
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
During a local fly-in event, a radio controlled airplane collided with a bi-plane while the bi-plane was performing a go-around. The radio controlled airplane was performing a hover maneuver just prior to the collision and initiated an escape maneuver which placed the radio controlled airplane right into the flight path of the bi-plane. The bi-plane sustained substantial damage, but was able to land without further incident. The radio controlled airplane was destroyed. Prior to the event, the event coordinator briefed the participants that they were to operate their radio controlled airplanes to the east of the runway, and not directly in the runway environment. While the event coordinator was monitoring the radio for traffic, it was not clearly communicated who, if anyone, was providing spotter duties for the radio controlled airplane operator prior to the collision.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
- The radio-controlled airplane operator’s decision to maneuver his airplane outside of the designated operating area, resulting in a collision with a bi-plane. Contributing to the accident was the lack of a formally designated spotter.
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.av...no=8&pgsize=50
but the event coordinator was at fault for not saying anything. The full scale was at fault because once he was made aware of the RC plane he should have stayed well clear of area.
#102
One major accident pays for all of it and much more. Also, I couldn't help but note that the amount AMA has paid in claims has gone up by quite a lot over last year. One major incident could also end the hobby as we know it. Seems to be a big roll of the dice. What's scary about rules designed to protect the hobby in today's media / litigation environment?
#103
I don't the NTSB got it fully right not that they care what I think. But we cannot put all the blame and responsibility on the RC pilot, If he was flying outside his designated area that was wrong but the event coordinator was at fault for not saying anything. The full scale was at fault because once he was made aware of the RC plane he should have stayed well clear of area.
Also, I suspect that no matter what, since we have the responsibility to avoid all full scale aircraft, if a model hits a plane for any reason, it's the model pilot's fault.
I agree with you that the CD / Event Coordinator deserves some attention. I'm of a culture that much more easily pushes some fault to the management system. Were this an accident I was investigating, I'd have added a findings of "Supervisory Error: Contest Director, failure to ensure proper designation of roles and responsibilities, and Supervisory Error: Contest Director, failure to enforce requirement to have properly trained and designated spotter present from engine start to engine shutdown, and Supervisory Error: Contest Director, failure to stop operations in violation of established safety course rules."
I'm sure many will disagree, but that's the way I was trained to think of accident investigation.
Last edited by franklin_m; 04-07-2015 at 03:20 PM.
#104
Sorry, I mssed it.......... When in the 75 year history of the largest model aviation association in the world did the full scale crash atributed to a model airplane happen? Had to have been millions of RC sorties over the years.
The most dangerous factor in full scale aircraft are the guys in the cockpit and not the toy at less then 400'AGL.
The most dangerous factor in full scale aircraft are the guys in the cockpit and not the toy at less then 400'AGL.
#105
Not yet, true, but only luck prevented the event above from being that one that you talk about. And just how different would our flying look today had that biplane crashed? A lot different I contend.
#106
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Don,
Excuse the long post. But since you asked what I'd do, I wanted to provide a full and complete answer.
Every successful safety management system (i.e. "programming") I've seen, whether personal safety, process safety, or aviation safety, has included several key similarities.
First, a person with formal safety training that reports directly to the organizational head on safety matters. In industry, they tend to be CSP's, in the military they are graduates of formal aviation safety schools (my experience).
Second, unambiguous operational and safety rules. I'm not talking wishy washing stuff like setbacks that are zero to some number (and waiverable at very low levels of the organization), I'm talking about genuine risk managed hard distances that are not easily waiverable. Yes, waivers exist, but they're rare and approved over someone's signature – an act that puts someone on paper as being accountable for the decision. Amazing how that alone changes how people think about safety.
Third, the organizations use leading vice lagging metrics. Lagging metrics are injuries and insurance payments. Leading metrics would be non-injury mishaps, near misses, equipment failures, rule violations that don't result in mishaps, etc. Perhaps focused tracking of crashes of certain aircraft types (large/fast for example). These allow you to do trend analysis as well.
Fourth, accountability. The effective programs I've seen or been part of ensure that enforcement is firm, fair, and - most importantly - consistent. I'm not saying you crush people for minor violations, but you do document and track them – all of them. Why? Those are called leading metrics! The reality is that absent accountability for not following rules, the culture develops what is called “Normalization of Deviance.” Simply put, it means the organization develops a culture that views rules like ice cream, easily melted. The distinction between big rules and small rules becomes blurred, and worse yet that distinction is in the eye of the beholder. It's chaos. If you want to see what happens in cultures like that, research the Texas City Refinery explosion, Shuttle Challenger, Shuttle Columbia, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and a host of others.
Fifth, a vibrant and honest safety communication system. The strongest cultures are very good at admitting mistakes, including those painful “pilot error” events. Only by being honest with ourselves can we really drive our risks down. It probably means fewer safety articles in MA written by English majors and more with hard technical content and first person stories about lessons learned.
Now, I'm sure there are some that will read this and react immediately to what they perceive as unrealistic, draconian, too many “rules”, etc. Each is entitled to their own opinion. While what I've described above sounds complex, it's really not all that onerous. It's highly scalable and very easy to implement – if the organization has the will to do it.
My interest in this is that sooner or later we're going to have an encounter between a passenger carrying aircraft or an injury to a spectator that makes the news unlike what we've seen before. As much as we like to think otherwise, there are some AMA members that not nearly so disciplined about following AMA rules as the commenters here. When that happens, what the media and the regulators will dig into the details of the “programming” and discover there's a lot of writing, few hard limits, and little if any enforcement. Furthermore, they'll find that we have no data to prove we're as good as we say. Sure, some will argue that the absence of prior incidents shows we're safe, unfortunately with modern safety theory, those interested in extracting money from AMA or using the incident to shut down flying sites will merely say we were lucky.
On the other hand, if we have a more professional safety management system ("programming") with the features I've described above, we'd like prevent such an event in the first place by "trapping" the rogue AMA member's lesser violations, and if it's not an AMA member, we could point to such a system as proof of our safety, with mounds of data to back it up -- thus preserving all of our ability to fly.
Excuse the long post. But since you asked what I'd do, I wanted to provide a full and complete answer.
Every successful safety management system (i.e. "programming") I've seen, whether personal safety, process safety, or aviation safety, has included several key similarities.
First, a person with formal safety training that reports directly to the organizational head on safety matters. In industry, they tend to be CSP's, in the military they are graduates of formal aviation safety schools (my experience).
Second, unambiguous operational and safety rules. I'm not talking wishy washing stuff like setbacks that are zero to some number (and waiverable at very low levels of the organization), I'm talking about genuine risk managed hard distances that are not easily waiverable. Yes, waivers exist, but they're rare and approved over someone's signature – an act that puts someone on paper as being accountable for the decision. Amazing how that alone changes how people think about safety.
Third, the organizations use leading vice lagging metrics. Lagging metrics are injuries and insurance payments. Leading metrics would be non-injury mishaps, near misses, equipment failures, rule violations that don't result in mishaps, etc. Perhaps focused tracking of crashes of certain aircraft types (large/fast for example). These allow you to do trend analysis as well.
Fourth, accountability. The effective programs I've seen or been part of ensure that enforcement is firm, fair, and - most importantly - consistent. I'm not saying you crush people for minor violations, but you do document and track them – all of them. Why? Those are called leading metrics! The reality is that absent accountability for not following rules, the culture develops what is called “Normalization of Deviance.” Simply put, it means the organization develops a culture that views rules like ice cream, easily melted. The distinction between big rules and small rules becomes blurred, and worse yet that distinction is in the eye of the beholder. It's chaos. If you want to see what happens in cultures like that, research the Texas City Refinery explosion, Shuttle Challenger, Shuttle Columbia, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and a host of others.
Fifth, a vibrant and honest safety communication system. The strongest cultures are very good at admitting mistakes, including those painful “pilot error” events. Only by being honest with ourselves can we really drive our risks down. It probably means fewer safety articles in MA written by English majors and more with hard technical content and first person stories about lessons learned.
Now, I'm sure there are some that will read this and react immediately to what they perceive as unrealistic, draconian, too many “rules”, etc. Each is entitled to their own opinion. While what I've described above sounds complex, it's really not all that onerous. It's highly scalable and very easy to implement – if the organization has the will to do it.
My interest in this is that sooner or later we're going to have an encounter between a passenger carrying aircraft or an injury to a spectator that makes the news unlike what we've seen before. As much as we like to think otherwise, there are some AMA members that not nearly so disciplined about following AMA rules as the commenters here. When that happens, what the media and the regulators will dig into the details of the “programming” and discover there's a lot of writing, few hard limits, and little if any enforcement. Furthermore, they'll find that we have no data to prove we're as good as we say. Sure, some will argue that the absence of prior incidents shows we're safe, unfortunately with modern safety theory, those interested in extracting money from AMA or using the incident to shut down flying sites will merely say we were lucky.
On the other hand, if we have a more professional safety management system ("programming") with the features I've described above, we'd like prevent such an event in the first place by "trapping" the rogue AMA member's lesser violations, and if it's not an AMA member, we could point to such a system as proof of our safety, with mounds of data to back it up -- thus preserving all of our ability to fly.
safety-nazi-programmed drones and kill it from within.
No thanks-I'd rather let die its own natural death.
#107
What about that is such reason for concern? After all, if we're all as good as we say were are here in these forums, we've got nothing to fear. On the other hand....
#108
You're right, NTSB doesn't give a darn what we think as individuals, though unfortunately they are the decision authority with respect to fault.
Also, I suspect that no matter what, since we have the responsibility to avoid all full scale aircraft, if a model hits a plane for any reason, it's the model pilot's fault.
.
Also, I suspect that no matter what, since we have the responsibility to avoid all full scale aircraft, if a model hits a plane for any reason, it's the model pilot's fault.
.
That line of thinking that if there is ever a conflict between it a full scale and a model it is always the models fault is flawed and one of the things wrong with our
society. Of course models should give the right of way to full scale when ever possible but all parties need to be held accountable and the more that have a
responsibility to act correctly the safer things are overall. In the incident we are discussing I think the RC pilot knew that the CD was in communication with
the full scale traffic and probably viewed him as a spotter also. Had the full scale stayed far to the left of the runway as requested I doubt the accident would
have happened. I am sure if the full scale had communicated his intention to do what he did the RC pilot may have had more advanced warning and the accident
may also have been avoided.
Last edited by ira d; 04-07-2015 at 05:03 PM.
#109
Don,
Excuse the long post. But since you asked what I'd do, I wanted to provide a full and complete answer.
Every successful safety management system (i.e. "programming") I've seen, whether personal safety, process safety, or aviation safety, has included several key similarities.
First, a person with formal safety training that reports directly to the organizational head on safety matters. In industry, they tend to be CSP's, in the military they are graduates of formal aviation safety schools (my experience).
Second, unambiguous operational and safety rules. I'm not talking wishy washing stuff like setbacks that are zero to some number (and waiverable at very low levels of the organization), I'm talking about genuine risk managed hard distances that are not easily waiverable. Yes, waivers exist, but they're rare and approved over someone's signature – an act that puts someone on paper as being accountable for the decision. Amazing how that alone changes how people think about safety.
Third, the organizations use leading vice lagging metrics. Lagging metrics are injuries and insurance payments. Leading metrics would be non-injury mishaps, near misses, equipment failures, rule violations that don't result in mishaps, etc. Perhaps focused tracking of crashes of certain aircraft types (large/fast for example). These allow you to do trend analysis as well.
Fourth, accountability. The effective programs I've seen or been part of ensure that enforcement is firm, fair, and - most importantly - consistent. I'm not saying you crush people for minor violations, but you do document and track them – all of them. Why? Those are called leading metrics! The reality is that absent accountability for not following rules, the culture develops what is called “Normalization of Deviance.” Simply put, it means the organization develops a culture that views rules like ice cream, easily melted. The distinction between big rules and small rules becomes blurred, and worse yet that distinction is in the eye of the beholder. It's chaos. If you want to see what happens in cultures like that, research the Texas City Refinery explosion, Shuttle Challenger, Shuttle Columbia, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and a host of others.
Fifth, a vibrant and honest safety communication system. The strongest cultures are very good at admitting mistakes, including those painful “pilot error” events. Only by being honest with ourselves can we really drive our risks down. It probably means fewer safety articles in MA written by English majors and more with hard technical content and first person stories about lessons learned.
Now, I'm sure there are some that will read this and react immediately to what they perceive as unrealistic, draconian, too many “rules”, etc. Each is entitled to their own opinion. While what I've described above sounds complex, it's really not all that onerous. It's highly scalable and very easy to implement – if the organization has the will to do it.
My interest in this is that sooner or later we're going to have an encounter between a passenger carrying aircraft or an injury to a spectator that makes the news unlike what we've seen before. As much as we like to think otherwise, there are some AMA members that not nearly so disciplined about following AMA rules as the commenters here. When that happens, what the media and the regulators will dig into the details of the “programming” and discover there's a lot of writing, few hard limits, and little if any enforcement. Furthermore, they'll find that we have no data to prove we're as good as we say. Sure, some will argue that the absence of prior incidents shows we're safe, unfortunately with modern safety theory, those interested in extracting money from AMA or using the incident to shut down flying sites will merely say we were lucky.
On the other hand, if we have a more professional safety management system ("programming") with the features I've described above, we'd like prevent such an event in the first place by "trapping" the rogue AMA member's lesser violations, and if it's not an AMA member, we could point to such a system as proof of our safety, with mounds of data to back it up -- thus preserving all of our ability to fly.
Excuse the long post. But since you asked what I'd do, I wanted to provide a full and complete answer.
Every successful safety management system (i.e. "programming") I've seen, whether personal safety, process safety, or aviation safety, has included several key similarities.
First, a person with formal safety training that reports directly to the organizational head on safety matters. In industry, they tend to be CSP's, in the military they are graduates of formal aviation safety schools (my experience).
Second, unambiguous operational and safety rules. I'm not talking wishy washing stuff like setbacks that are zero to some number (and waiverable at very low levels of the organization), I'm talking about genuine risk managed hard distances that are not easily waiverable. Yes, waivers exist, but they're rare and approved over someone's signature – an act that puts someone on paper as being accountable for the decision. Amazing how that alone changes how people think about safety.
Third, the organizations use leading vice lagging metrics. Lagging metrics are injuries and insurance payments. Leading metrics would be non-injury mishaps, near misses, equipment failures, rule violations that don't result in mishaps, etc. Perhaps focused tracking of crashes of certain aircraft types (large/fast for example). These allow you to do trend analysis as well.
Fourth, accountability. The effective programs I've seen or been part of ensure that enforcement is firm, fair, and - most importantly - consistent. I'm not saying you crush people for minor violations, but you do document and track them – all of them. Why? Those are called leading metrics! The reality is that absent accountability for not following rules, the culture develops what is called “Normalization of Deviance.” Simply put, it means the organization develops a culture that views rules like ice cream, easily melted. The distinction between big rules and small rules becomes blurred, and worse yet that distinction is in the eye of the beholder. It's chaos. If you want to see what happens in cultures like that, research the Texas City Refinery explosion, Shuttle Challenger, Shuttle Columbia, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and a host of others.
Fifth, a vibrant and honest safety communication system. The strongest cultures are very good at admitting mistakes, including those painful “pilot error” events. Only by being honest with ourselves can we really drive our risks down. It probably means fewer safety articles in MA written by English majors and more with hard technical content and first person stories about lessons learned.
Now, I'm sure there are some that will read this and react immediately to what they perceive as unrealistic, draconian, too many “rules”, etc. Each is entitled to their own opinion. While what I've described above sounds complex, it's really not all that onerous. It's highly scalable and very easy to implement – if the organization has the will to do it.
My interest in this is that sooner or later we're going to have an encounter between a passenger carrying aircraft or an injury to a spectator that makes the news unlike what we've seen before. As much as we like to think otherwise, there are some AMA members that not nearly so disciplined about following AMA rules as the commenters here. When that happens, what the media and the regulators will dig into the details of the “programming” and discover there's a lot of writing, few hard limits, and little if any enforcement. Furthermore, they'll find that we have no data to prove we're as good as we say. Sure, some will argue that the absence of prior incidents shows we're safe, unfortunately with modern safety theory, those interested in extracting money from AMA or using the incident to shut down flying sites will merely say we were lucky.
On the other hand, if we have a more professional safety management system ("programming") with the features I've described above, we'd like prevent such an event in the first place by "trapping" the rogue AMA member's lesser violations, and if it's not an AMA member, we could point to such a system as proof of our safety, with mounds of data to back it up -- thus preserving all of our ability to fly.
#110
I agree. I fear that nothing will change until after there's a major accident / injury -- then I fear it will be too late.
The regulators and litigators will start digging through AMA documents, deposing AMA officials, the Contest Director, etc. and asking questions about what formal training have they had in safety, what formal training or experience in aircraft structural design & test, in aerodynamics, in policy making and implementation, etc. Then later those people will be called to testify in court, where they'll have to admit that they don't have much in the way of formal training, and that they really don't see themselves as being responsible for enforcement of their own "guidelines." Contrast that with what will appear for the other side, a parade of people with formal training in safety program management, formal training in aviation safety, and a virtual parade of witnesses placing AMA officials at events where they knew or should have known their own guidelines were not being followed -- and they did nothing. It'll be abundantly clear the "programming" they sold to FAA and legislators isn't much more than paper.
At that point the legislators will get involved, and there'll be a quick update to section 336. Meanwhile, back at AMA, they'll be selling off assets to try and pay the settlement costs.
Doom and gloom, perhaps. But in today's mass media / litigious society, can we afford to rely on luck?
Last edited by franklin_m; 04-07-2015 at 06:35 PM.
#111
That line of thinking that if there is ever a conflict between it a full scale and a model it is always the models fault is flawed and one of the things wrong with our society. Of course models should give the right of way to full scale when ever possible but all parties need to be held accountable and the more that have a responsibility to act correctly the safer things are overall. In the incident we are discussing I think the RC pilot knew that the CD was in communication with the full scale traffic and probably viewed him as a spotter also. Had the full scale stayed far to the left of the runway as requested I doubt the accident would have happened. I am sure if the full scale had communicated his intention to do what he did the RC pilot may have had more advanced warning and the accident may also have been avoided.
Pretty cut and dry by the FAR and thus an easy conclusion from the NTSB's standpoint.
I suppose it's easier now that PL112-95 section 336 (a)(4) requires unambiguously that the [model] “aircraft is operated in a manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any manned aircraft.” So from the moment that was signed, it really doesn't matter what the manned aircraft does, the model has to give way and not interfere.
#112
What it probably came down to was (1) the RC pilot was not where he was supposed to be. (2) The full scale go-around was a result of the RC airplane being where it was not supposed to be. (3) The full scale had the right of way per FAR 91.113 (g) which states that “ Aircraft, while on final approach to land or while landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight or operating on the surface.” Lastly, the “event coordinator” is not ATC, therefore the “request” was not compulsory. Regardless, the full scale pilot complied with his requirements in that he stated his intention to execute a go-around – only to have the RC pilot who was not where he was supposed to be in the first place then execute another maneuver that put him in the path of the go around – thus being in the wrong spot not once, but twice.
Pretty cut and dry by the FAR and thus an easy conclusion from the NTSB's standpoint.
I suppose it's easier now that PL112-95 section 336 (a)(4) requires unambiguously that the [model] “aircraft is operated in a manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any manned aircraft.” So from the moment that was signed, it really doesn't matter what the manned aircraft does, the model has to give way and not interfere.
the circumstances. I also don't believe it does not matter in any case what the full scale may do, And I think if the bipe had crashed as a result of the collision and lawyers had got involved
the RC pilot would not have received all the blame.
One thing to remember just because you have a the right of way does not mean it's always prudent to take it. If a plane lands on a occupied runway because he has the right of way by the
letter of the law and causes a crash that pilot can be held responsible if it can be shown they had other choices.
Bottom line from a common sense point of view the full scale had just as much fault as anyone else because the pilot knew a RC craft was near the runway and should have stayed well clear.
#113
Here's the NTSB's determination. Unfortunately, I think that no matter what, the model pilot has the requirement to avoid full scale. Regardless, in this case, it's evident the NTSB determined it was the model pilot who was at fault. What concerns me is what would our hobby look like today if that airplane crashed and injured pilot, spectators, or worse?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSB Identification: CEN10LA487
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, August 14, 2010 in Brighton, CO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/19/2011
Aircraft: SHPAKOW THOMAS SA 750, registration: N28KT
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
During a local fly-in event, a radio controlled airplane collided with a bi-plane while the bi-plane was performing a go-around. The radio controlled airplane was performing a hover maneuver just prior to the collision and initiated an escape maneuver which placed the radio controlled airplane right into the flight path of the bi-plane. The bi-plane sustained substantial damage, but was able to land without further incident. The radio controlled airplane was destroyed. Prior to the event, the event coordinator briefed the participants that they were to operate their radio controlled airplanes to the east of the runway, and not directly in the runway environment. While the event coordinator was monitoring the radio for traffic, it was not clearly communicated who, if anyone, was providing spotter duties for the radio controlled airplane operator prior to the collision.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.av...no=8&pgsize=50
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSB Identification: CEN10LA487
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, August 14, 2010 in Brighton, CO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/19/2011
Aircraft: SHPAKOW THOMAS SA 750, registration: N28KT
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
During a local fly-in event, a radio controlled airplane collided with a bi-plane while the bi-plane was performing a go-around. The radio controlled airplane was performing a hover maneuver just prior to the collision and initiated an escape maneuver which placed the radio controlled airplane right into the flight path of the bi-plane. The bi-plane sustained substantial damage, but was able to land without further incident. The radio controlled airplane was destroyed. Prior to the event, the event coordinator briefed the participants that they were to operate their radio controlled airplanes to the east of the runway, and not directly in the runway environment. While the event coordinator was monitoring the radio for traffic, it was not clearly communicated who, if anyone, was providing spotter duties for the radio controlled airplane operator prior to the collision.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
- The radio-controlled airplane operator’s decision to maneuver his airplane outside of the designated operating area, resulting in a collision with a bi-plane. Contributing to the accident was the lack of a formally designated spotter.
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.av...no=8&pgsize=50
#114
What I don't understand is what's wrong with having a single POC for safety at AMA, having unambiguous rules, being accountable for following the rules, collecting data to prove we're as good as we say, and having a safety publication (or section in the magazine) were people are courageous enough to admit that they screwed up so others could learn from it?
We have that! Or maybe you mean one that shares that information, and one that harps on avoidance of full scale each month? As opposed to safety articles that harp on getting your fingers in the prop, or tracking over the pit area, etc.
#115
What it probably came down to was (1) the RC pilot was not where he was supposed to be. (2) The full scale go-around was a result of the RC airplane being where it was not supposed to be. (3) The full scale had the right of way per FAR 91.113 (g) which states that “ Aircraft, while on final approach to land or while landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight or operating on the surface.” Lastly, the “event coordinator” is not ATC, therefore the “request” was not compulsory. Regardless, the full scale pilot complied with his requirements in that he stated his intention to execute a go-around – only to have the RC pilot who was not where he was supposed to be in the first place then execute another maneuver that put him in the path of the go around – thus being in the wrong spot not once, but twice.
#116
#117
Not sure where you got that information, so if you can steer me to it, I'd be interested to read the report. I did search FAA action, found a report from sUAS news that indicates the FAA report they obtained was aligned with the NTSB report. http://www.suasnews.com/2011/03/4833...cident-report/
http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/OnODoc...ation/5604.pdf
I believe that report was just the initial findings and only reported what the witness's told them, not the complete findings of the FAA.
#118
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What I don't understand is what's wrong with having a single POC for safety at AMA, having unambiguous rules, being accountable for following the rules, collecting data to prove we're as good as we say, and having a safety publication (or section in the magazine) were people are courageous enough to admit that they screwed up so others could learn from it?
What about that is such reason for concern? After all, if we're all as good as we say were are here in these forums, we've got nothing to fear. On the other hand....
What about that is such reason for concern? After all, if we're all as good as we say were are here in these forums, we've got nothing to fear. On the other hand....
reporting, analysis and implimentation to this hobby. The costs in time and money would be prohibitive for the average modeler and at the club level. To do what you want would require a team of pro accident investigators at every flying site.
The focus correctly has been, and should be, adhering to a simple, easily understandable set of safety guidelines, and most importantly, operate in a safe environment.
#119
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I just don't think you have thought through the ramifications of applying professional testing, certification, investigation, data-gathering,
reporting, analysis and implimentation to this hobby. The costs in time and money would be prohibitive for the average modeler and at the club level. To do what you want would require a team of pro accident investigators at every flying site.
The focus correctly has been, and should be, adhering to a simple, easily understandable set of safety guidelines, and most importantly, operate in a safe environment.
reporting, analysis and implimentation to this hobby. The costs in time and money would be prohibitive for the average modeler and at the club level. To do what you want would require a team of pro accident investigators at every flying site.
The focus correctly has been, and should be, adhering to a simple, easily understandable set of safety guidelines, and most importantly, operate in a safe environment.
#120
But then would the job of Chief AMA Safety Officer that he is lobbying for go away?.
Last edited by bradpaul; 04-08-2015 at 07:19 AM.