Are we as hobbyist UAS users in the clear for now? can we jump for joy? or to soon?
07-26-2016, 11:58 AM
#451
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
You can attempt to mock this all you want, but the reality is that we know about those risks because they're recorded, tracked, and analyzed for mishap prevention programs.
Contrast that with any number of sUAS near misses that never get reported, let alone recorded, tracked, and analyzed for mishap prevention purposes.
Contrast that with any number of sUAS near misses that never get reported, let alone recorded, tracked, and analyzed for mishap prevention purposes.
I'm still waiting for your answer to what can be done to stop future incidents to an absolute 100% certainty. You can point to 100 different policies, procedures, programs, protocols etc, but not a one of the is going to give us the golden bullet. I've seen you walk back statements before, this sure seems like one that would fit. There's no legitimate way to spin this other than the obvious result, nothing is guaranteed.
07-26-2016, 12:06 PM
#452
An effective safety program is constantly going after issues like undefined standards. I.E. the "minimal voltage drop" sort of thing.
07-26-2016, 12:10 PM
#453
Great....so the inspections can be improved. Are you saying that these inspections will lead to 0 future incidents? Absolute certainty? If the answer is yes, well...I don't believe it.
If the answer is no, well then....would it be safe to say there is only so much that can be done?
If the answer is no, well then....would it be safe to say there is only so much that can be done?
My point is that even when there are mishaps that could illustrate weaknesses in the inspection program, the inspection program doesn't change.
07-26-2016, 12:20 PM
#454
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
It's about believing it's possible. Not any one silver bullet. But if you've got ambiguity and arbitrary in policy (i.e. undefined "minimal voltage drop), then by definition you're going to have ambiguity and arbitrary execution of that policy. That results in greater chance of a mishap due to the inconsistent execution of a poorly written policy.
An effective safety program is constantly going after issues like undefined standards. I.E. the "minimal voltage drop" sort of thing.
An effective safety program is constantly going after issues like undefined standards. I.E. the "minimal voltage drop" sort of thing.
Great comment on effective safety programs, got one that's perfect? Got a standard that's perfect, that will absolutely preclude any issues?
If not, looks like there is a limit to what can be done. Is that better wording for you, or are you going to double down?
07-26-2016, 12:24 PM
#455
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
So if the inspections can be improved, then why not? It's not like they didn't provide detail in other parts of that policy. They went into considerable detail on control surface sizing relative to servo ratings. Maybe they should do the same for wing spars (might have prevented one of those B29 losses), or a requirement to demonstrate directional control at full power with the critical engine at idle (might have prevented another of the B29 losses), etc.
My point is that even when there are mishaps that could illustrate weaknesses in the inspection program, the inspection program doesn't change.
My point is that even when there are mishaps that could illustrate weaknesses in the inspection program, the inspection program doesn't change.
Which is it, do you have a specific solution to this problem, or will you accept that there is only much that can be done to prevent things from happening?
07-26-2016, 12:25 PM
#456
Want more easy objective criteria for evaluating the safety of a LMA?
Well, if you're gonna do a level 60 degree turn, the math says you're gonna pull 2G. If you want to do a loop, you're looking at 4G or more. For a 100lb airplane to loop, that means the wing will have to support at least 400lbs. But I'm sure you want a safety margin, so how much? 1.5? 2.0? or more? Well, then take the loop requirement and multiply by your safety factor, and make the inspector verify the wing can support that amount. If the builder is unwilling, then approve for flight but only approve non-aerobatic flights.
Using science and objective standards to reduce risk. What a concept!
Well, if you're gonna do a level 60 degree turn, the math says you're gonna pull 2G. If you want to do a loop, you're looking at 4G or more. For a 100lb airplane to loop, that means the wing will have to support at least 400lbs. But I'm sure you want a safety margin, so how much? 1.5? 2.0? or more? Well, then take the loop requirement and multiply by your safety factor, and make the inspector verify the wing can support that amount. If the builder is unwilling, then approve for flight but only approve non-aerobatic flights.
Using science and objective standards to reduce risk. What a concept!
07-26-2016, 12:27 PM
#457
Set objective standards for directional control in multi engine planes (cause of another B29 crash)
07-26-2016, 12:30 PM
#458
07-26-2016, 12:32 PM
#459
Want more easy objective criteria for evaluating the safety of a LMA?
Well, if you're gonna do a level 60 degree turn, the math says you're gonna pull 2G. If you want to do a loop, you're looking at 4G or more. For a 100lb airplane to loop, that means the wing will have to support at least 400lbs. But I'm sure you want a safety margin, so how much? 1.5? 2.0? or more? Well, then take the loop requirement and multiply by your safety factor, and make the inspector verify the wing can support that amount. If the builder is unwilling, then approve for flight but only approve non-aerobatic flights.
Using science and objective standards to reduce risk. What a concept!
Well, if you're gonna do a level 60 degree turn, the math says you're gonna pull 2G. If you want to do a loop, you're looking at 4G or more. For a 100lb airplane to loop, that means the wing will have to support at least 400lbs. But I'm sure you want a safety margin, so how much? 1.5? 2.0? or more? Well, then take the loop requirement and multiply by your safety factor, and make the inspector verify the wing can support that amount. If the builder is unwilling, then approve for flight but only approve non-aerobatic flights.
Using science and objective standards to reduce risk. What a concept!
<iframe width="420" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/IYFVw4DFqXo" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
07-26-2016, 12:35 PM
#460
"Multi-Engine LMAs : With the critical engine off, demonstrate the ability to accelerate to takeoff speed and abort to a stop while deviating not more than 1/2 wingspan from runway centerline at any point in the process from throttle up to stop."
"Wing Spars" : For LMA approved for unlimited aerobatics, demonstrate that the aircraft wingspar supports not less than XX times the aircraft gross weight w/o failure. For LMA approved for non-aerobatic flight, demonstrate the aircraft wingspar supports not less than YY times the aircraft gross weight, and the flight approval documentation shall be annotated that the aircraft is approved only for 'non-aerobatic flight."
"Wing Spars" : For LMA approved for unlimited aerobatics, demonstrate that the aircraft wingspar supports not less than XX times the aircraft gross weight w/o failure. For LMA approved for non-aerobatic flight, demonstrate the aircraft wingspar supports not less than YY times the aircraft gross weight, and the flight approval documentation shall be annotated that the aircraft is approved only for 'non-aerobatic flight."
07-26-2016, 12:37 PM
#461
In another it was abundantly evident that the aircraft was unable to maintain centerline with the left outboard engine at less than full power.
So unless the wings were designed to be folding (at the root) or if that sudden veer toward the crowd at WOD was intentional, then it's pretty much wing failure and loss of directional control.
Last edited by franklin_m; 07-26-2016 at 12:40 PM.
07-26-2016, 12:53 PM
#463
07-26-2016, 12:55 PM
#464
One crashes was due to wing failure (when the wings fold up in flight, that's a dead giveaway).
In another it was abundantly evident that the aircraft was unable to maintain centerline with the left outboard engine at less than full power.
So unless the wings were designed to be folding (at the root) or if that sudden veer toward the crowd at WOD was intentional, then it's pretty much wing failure and loss of directional control.
In another it was abundantly evident that the aircraft was unable to maintain centerline with the left outboard engine at less than full power.
So unless the wings were designed to be folding (at the root) or if that sudden veer toward the crowd at WOD was intentional, then it's pretty much wing failure and loss of directional control.
What objective standards did you use and where did you apply them?
07-26-2016, 01:04 PM
#465
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
Want more easy objective criteria for evaluating the safety of a LMA?
Well, if you're gonna do a level 60 degree turn, the math says you're gonna pull 2G. If you want to do a loop, you're looking at 4G or more. For a 100lb airplane to loop, that means the wing will have to support at least 400lbs. But I'm sure you want a safety margin, so how much? 1.5? 2.0? or more? Well, then take the loop requirement and multiply by your safety factor, and make the inspector verify the wing can support that amount. If the builder is unwilling, then approve for flight but only approve non-aerobatic flights.
Using science and objective standards to reduce risk. What a concept!
Well, if you're gonna do a level 60 degree turn, the math says you're gonna pull 2G. If you want to do a loop, you're looking at 4G or more. For a 100lb airplane to loop, that means the wing will have to support at least 400lbs. But I'm sure you want a safety margin, so how much? 1.5? 2.0? or more? Well, then take the loop requirement and multiply by your safety factor, and make the inspector verify the wing can support that amount. If the builder is unwilling, then approve for flight but only approve non-aerobatic flights.
Using science and objective standards to reduce risk. What a concept!
All great points, who doesn't love objective standards. But pray tell, where are your perfect standards? Where is your solution to end all future mishaps.
I don't belabor it any longer, your refusal to accept that there is always more work to be done, and refusal to answer the question I asked about your solution is obvious, you don't have one.
07-26-2016, 01:10 PM
#466
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
Stop trying to hard to be the conscience and hall monitor of this and other threads, it's not your job. The outrage gets old. You're the only one stirring things up lately. Stop already.
Got an on topic point, if so share it. If not, do what Ken said to do and either put folks on Ignore or hit the back key.
07-26-2016, 01:13 PM
#467
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
"Multi-Engine LMAs : With the critical engine off, demonstrate the ability to accelerate to takeoff speed and abort to a stop while deviating not more than 1/2 wingspan from runway centerline at any point in the process from throttle up to stop."
"Wing Spars" : For LMA approved for unlimited aerobatics, demonstrate that the aircraft wingspar supports not less than XX times the aircraft gross weight w/o failure. For LMA approved for non-aerobatic flight, demonstrate the aircraft wingspar supports not less than YY times the aircraft gross weight, and the flight approval documentation shall be annotated that the aircraft is approved only for 'non-aerobatic flight."
"Wing Spars" : For LMA approved for unlimited aerobatics, demonstrate that the aircraft wingspar supports not less than XX times the aircraft gross weight w/o failure. For LMA approved for non-aerobatic flight, demonstrate the aircraft wingspar supports not less than YY times the aircraft gross weight, and the flight approval documentation shall be annotated that the aircraft is approved only for 'non-aerobatic flight."
07-26-2016, 01:41 PM
#470
Short of not flying, what steps would you suggest everyone take to ensure no future incidents. Specifically, not some post incident report, but something that would absolutely preclude future issues. Because you keep talking about steps taken after accidents, and belief systems that don't seem to be working out so well for the military. All great things to educate and help stop possible future losses, but nothing to guarantee it.
In the WOD crash, which was directly a result of being unable to maintain centerline, it was only luck that the plane did not land in the crowd. And I say that because when you do a frame by frame look at the videos, you can see it was full right rudder, full right aileron, and full up elevator from the start of the takeoff roll through impact.
So a requirement to maintain runway centerline with a critical engine out would have prevented that airplane from veering toward the crowd (unless he did it on purpose, which I DO NOT think he did).
Would you not want to have to learn that same lesson again? Perhaps with injuries at the next one?
07-26-2016, 01:58 PM
#472
So utterly predictable . So , now it's about thread purity , is it ? YOU are the one who ran off at the mouth about personal insults , I post up a couple of textbook ones that your buddy posted and now it's all about thread purity ? So are you going to answer the question , are those personal insults or not ? Or are you gonna do the slimy slink away from something you said like your buddy did after calling us all potential crooks ? Oh now I get it , they are only personal insults when they are directed at you or your flunkie , but anything you say to anyone is just fine , is that how it is here ? Your as transparent as a clean window on a sunny day .......
Maybe you should read the memo again. Wasn't there something specifically addressed to you by the Admin about you calling the kettle black?
07-26-2016, 02:35 PM
#475
You'll notice that in the case of the runway centerline, it's "task & tolerance." Task is to maintain runway centerline and objective tolerance is 1/2 wingspan. To measure it as a developmental tester guy, all we'd do then is measure the compensation required to do the task to that tolerance. Did it all the time in Beavers (to demonstrate a directionally unstable aircraft). Task was to maintain runway centerline, tolerance was +/- ten feet, and compensation was to count the number of rudder inputs from brake release to takeoff. The lesson was then for the students to develop, based on collective data they took, to determine what they thought would be an acceptable compensation for an average pilot.
In U-21s, we did a similar exercise to develop Vmc. At altitude, gear and flaps down, and chop power on the critical engine. Did that in 5 knot increments until the students felt the nose swing was excessive. Then added 5kt to it and set as Vmc.
So, I argue that based on quantifiable standards, an airplane that can't maintain runway centerline to within 1/2 wingspan is out of control. It also allows sufficient safety margin to ensure it doesn't end up sending the crowd diving for safety (like we saw in on B29 crash).
Now, if AMA wanted to be even more scientific about setting load factor tests, they'd ask for folks to put those handy little G sensors in their aircraft, perhaps even at the NATS, and collect actual data on G loads. Then decide on a standard for the LMA program based on data collected in performances.