Are we as hobbyist UAS users in the clear for now? can we jump for joy? or to soon?
07-26-2016, 02:44 PM
#476
Franklin , it isn't about model airplanes with these two , haven't you figured that out yet ? They have NO lives whatsoever , they post here literally around the clock , and the whole objective is to argue with anyone that isn't in their little favored circle of Trolls . You post facts , they post attacks against you . And they actually delude each other into thinking they are actually "winning" some point or another here , what absolute losers the two are , nothing but useless losers .....
When one or more wings fold up at the root, it doesn't take a genius to know the spar failed. By definition then it was insufficient to support flight loads. So, why not learn from that and build an objective test for spar strength? Not unlike the pull test in a CL event. But some don't want to consider such a standard because it won't prevent 100% of mishaps. So rather than prevent future mishaps due to inadequate design/construction, they advocate doing nothing.
Same with video of an aircraft that veered sharply left toward the crowd from the start of the takeoff roll through impact. Now, unless the pilot did that intentionally, which I do not thing was the case, then it's clear the aircraft was unable to maintain directional control. Again, rather than learn from the incident and create an LMA standard to demonstrate directional control with one engine out, some don't want to do anything because it won't prevent 100% of mishaps.
A genuine safety program would look at these events and then adjust the LMA inspection process to incorporate the lessons learned. Instead, we have folks who advocate doing nothing since these changes would not prevent 100% of future mishaps.
07-26-2016, 02:46 PM
#477
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
So utterly predictable . So , now it's about thread purity , is it ? YOU are the one who ran off at the mouth about personal insults , I post up a couple of textbook ones that your buddy posted and now it's all about thread purity ? So are you going to answer the question , are those personal insults or not ? Or are you gonna do the slimy slink away from something you said like your buddy did after calling us all potential crooks ? Oh now I get it , they are only personal insults when they are directed at you or your flunkie , but anything you say to anyone is just fine , is that how it is here ? Your as transparent as a clean window on a sunny day .......
07-26-2016, 02:49 PM
#478
Well, I am a graduate of a military developmental test pilot school, and a former instructor at the same. I'm also a graduate of a formal aviation safety school. So it's hardly armchair engineering. I'm certainly smart enough to never write a standard so woefully inadequate as a "minimal voltage drop."
You'll notice that in the case of the runway centerline, it's "task & tolerance." Task is to maintain runway centerline and objective tolerance is 1/2 wingspan. To measure it as a developmental tester guy, all we'd do then is measure the compensation required to do the task to that tolerance. Did it all the time in Beavers (to demonstrate a directionally unstable aircraft). Task was to maintain runway centerline, tolerance was +/- ten feet, and compensation was to count the number of rudder inputs from brake release to takeoff. The lesson was then for the students to develop, based on collective data they took, to determine what they thought would be an acceptable compensation for an average pilot.
In U-21s, we did a similar exercise to develop Vmc. At altitude, gear and flaps down, and chop power on the critical engine. Did that in 5 knot increments until the students felt the nose swing was excessive. Then added 5kt to it and set as Vmc.
So, I argue that based on quantifiable standards, an airplane that can't maintain runway centerline to within 1/2 wingspan is out of control. It also allows sufficient safety margin to ensure it doesn't end up sending the crowd diving for safety (like we saw in on B29 crash).
Now, if AMA wanted to be even more scientific about setting load factor tests, they'd ask for folks to put those handy little G sensors in their aircraft, perhaps even at the NATS, and collect actual data on G loads. Then decide on a standard for the LMA program based on data collected in performances.
You'll notice that in the case of the runway centerline, it's "task & tolerance." Task is to maintain runway centerline and objective tolerance is 1/2 wingspan. To measure it as a developmental tester guy, all we'd do then is measure the compensation required to do the task to that tolerance. Did it all the time in Beavers (to demonstrate a directionally unstable aircraft). Task was to maintain runway centerline, tolerance was +/- ten feet, and compensation was to count the number of rudder inputs from brake release to takeoff. The lesson was then for the students to develop, based on collective data they took, to determine what they thought would be an acceptable compensation for an average pilot.
In U-21s, we did a similar exercise to develop Vmc. At altitude, gear and flaps down, and chop power on the critical engine. Did that in 5 knot increments until the students felt the nose swing was excessive. Then added 5kt to it and set as Vmc.
So, I argue that based on quantifiable standards, an airplane that can't maintain runway centerline to within 1/2 wingspan is out of control. It also allows sufficient safety margin to ensure it doesn't end up sending the crowd diving for safety (like we saw in on B29 crash).
Now, if AMA wanted to be even more scientific about setting load factor tests, they'd ask for folks to put those handy little G sensors in their aircraft, perhaps even at the NATS, and collect actual data on G loads. Then decide on a standard for the LMA program based on data collected in performances.
07-26-2016, 02:54 PM
#479
Franklin , it isn't about model airplanes with these two , haven't you figured that out yet ? They have NO lives whatsoever , they post here literally around the clock , and the whole objective is to argue with anyone that isn't in their little favored circle of Trolls . You post facts , they post attacks against you . And they actually delude each other into thinking they are actually "winning" some point or another here , what absolute losers the two are , nothing but useless losers .....
07-26-2016, 03:12 PM
#482
Perhaps you could teach us the physics behind the 2G 60 degree turn and explain why airspeed does not matter? How about explaining the physics behind a loop. Or perhaps talk about "available G" in a loop? Maybe L/D curves and explain how to determine the max range and max endurance of aircraft? Perhaps you could explain why the nose pitches down upon flap extension? Or how an airplane behaves (in pitch) as it transitions from supersonic to subsonic ... and why.
Or if you don't want to talk about that, maybe you could explain how you determine what warning and caution lights were illuminated at impact? Or how to tell what controls the pilot was attempting to input at impact? Maybe you can tell us how to determine the type of metal failure in a wing spar in wreckage?
Impress us with your acumen....
07-26-2016, 03:16 PM
#483
Developmental flight testing requires an intimate knowledge of structures, engineering, control system design, physics, propulsion, and aerodynamics.
Perhaps you could teach us the physics behind the 2G 60 degree turn and explain why airspeed does not matter? How about explaining the physics behind a loop. Or perhaps talk about "available G" in a loop? Maybe L/D curves and explain how to determine the max range and max endurance of aircraft? Perhaps you could explain why the nose pitches down upon flap extension? Or how an airplane behaves (in pitch) as it transitions from supersonic to subsonic ... and why.
Or if you don't want to talk about that, maybe you could explain how you determine what warning and caution lights were illuminated at impact? Or how to tell what controls the pilot was attempting to input at impact? Maybe you can tell us how to determine the type of metal failure in a wing spar in wreckage?
Impress us with your acumen....
Perhaps you could teach us the physics behind the 2G 60 degree turn and explain why airspeed does not matter? How about explaining the physics behind a loop. Or perhaps talk about "available G" in a loop? Maybe L/D curves and explain how to determine the max range and max endurance of aircraft? Perhaps you could explain why the nose pitches down upon flap extension? Or how an airplane behaves (in pitch) as it transitions from supersonic to subsonic ... and why.
Or if you don't want to talk about that, maybe you could explain how you determine what warning and caution lights were illuminated at impact? Or how to tell what controls the pilot was attempting to input at impact? Maybe you can tell us how to determine the type of metal failure in a wing spar in wreckage?
Impress us with your acumen....
07-26-2016, 03:32 PM
#484
And you?
07-26-2016, 03:41 PM
#485
Bachelors in Physics with a math minor, Masters in Engineering (concentration in structures & use of composites in structures). Graduate military test pilot school, instructor military test pilot school, and graduate military aviation safety school. Three years experience planning and flying developmental test flights, to include envelope expansion, and subsequent data analysis and test data reporting.
And you?
And you?
07-26-2016, 03:53 PM
#486
07-26-2016, 04:28 PM
#487
07-26-2016, 04:59 PM
#489
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
"....Thanks. They're not interested in even reasonable steps to learn from one mishap to prevent others. That B29 crash at WOD was the third full loss crash of that plane/pilot combo. Thankfully two of them were on video, which provides pretty good basis for analysis. As a formally trained accident investigator, video is considered one of the better pieces of evidence.
The mere fact that there are post accident reviews, of which you are no doubt sometimes involved with, is prima facie evidence that not everything has been done to stop accidents from happening. All the other stuff is just diversion and noise.
07-26-2016, 05:22 PM
#490
So ideas that prevent some future events, but not 100% certainty get rejected? Seems to me that you're trying to have it both ways. On one hand saying that you want to learn from mishaps, but on the other saying you don't want to make changes unless they're going to work with 100% certainty? Or because they're not a golden bullet?
So, just curious, in light of the two B29 cases we've discussed, what's wrong with changing the LMA inspection standard to address those two specific mishap causal factors? Seems to me they're reasonable, rational, and very executable. In fact, you could easily do a lot for the wing spar issue by collecting actual data during the NATS and then using that to set standards and safety factors for LMAs and / or authorized maneuvers based on level of stress applied.
07-26-2016, 05:52 PM
#491
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
So then why make this statement? "I'm still waiting for your answer to what can be done to stop future incidents to an absolute 100% certainty. You can point to 100 different policies, procedures, programs, protocols etc, but not a one of the is going to give us the golden bullet. [emphasis added]"
So ideas that prevent some future events, but not 100% certainty get rejected? Seems to me that you're trying to have it both ways. On one hand saying that you want to learn from mishaps, but on the other saying you don't want to make changes unless they're going to work with 100% certainty? Or because they're not a golden bullet?
So, just curious, in light of the two B29 cases we've discussed, what's wrong with changing the LMA inspection standard to address those two specific mishap causal factors? Seems to me they're reasonable, rational, and very executable. In fact, you could easily do a lot for the wing spar issue by collecting actual data during the NATS and then using that to set standards and safety factors for LMAs and / or authorized maneuvers based on level of stress applied.
So ideas that prevent some future events, but not 100% certainty get rejected? Seems to me that you're trying to have it both ways. On one hand saying that you want to learn from mishaps, but on the other saying you don't want to make changes unless they're going to work with 100% certainty? Or because they're not a golden bullet?
So, just curious, in light of the two B29 cases we've discussed, what's wrong with changing the LMA inspection standard to address those two specific mishap causal factors? Seems to me they're reasonable, rational, and very executable. In fact, you could easily do a lot for the wing spar issue by collecting actual data during the NATS and then using that to set standards and safety factors for LMAs and / or authorized maneuvers based on level of stress applied.
"There is only so much that can be done"
Again, a demonstrable fact, not even close to being an opinion or a "spin". For several pages now you've doubled and trippled down, and started coming up with all sort of diversionary noise to avoid that fact. There is no silver or gold bullet, or a magic formula or panacea to avoid future accidents. Which means, more can be done.
I think it's as clear as can be, but it looks like you feel the same on your point, I guess we'll just agree to disagree on the issue. If we don't, I'm afraid we'll see more mortifying decent into madness that seems be creeping back into the threads lately. Honestly, it's disturbing to see.
07-26-2016, 06:06 PM
#492
So I take it you're choosing not to answer the question about the two very specific and actionable suggested changes to the LMA inspection program - two suggestions borne from lessons learned from actual mishaps? To refresh:
What's wrong with changing the LMA inspection standard to address those two specific mishap causal factors? Seems to me they're reasonable, rational, and very executable. A requirement to demonstrate the wing spar can actually support the expected flight loads (plus a safety factor), and a requirement to demonstrate that a multi engine plane can maintain directional control on the ground with the critical engine failed?
Neither will prevent 100% of mishaps, but both seem pretty reasonable in light of two total loss mishaps involving a LMA, one of which could quite easily have resulted in serious injuries (remember all those people diving for safety?).
What's wrong with changing the LMA inspection standard to address those two specific mishap causal factors? Seems to me they're reasonable, rational, and very executable. A requirement to demonstrate the wing spar can actually support the expected flight loads (plus a safety factor), and a requirement to demonstrate that a multi engine plane can maintain directional control on the ground with the critical engine failed?
Neither will prevent 100% of mishaps, but both seem pretty reasonable in light of two total loss mishaps involving a LMA, one of which could quite easily have resulted in serious injuries (remember all those people diving for safety?).
07-26-2016, 06:15 PM
#493
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
So I take it you're choosing not to answer the question about the two very specific and actionable suggested changes to the LMA inspection program - two suggestions borne from lessons learned from actual mishaps? To refresh:
What's wrong with changing the LMA inspection standard to address those two specific mishap causal factors? Seems to me they're reasonable, rational, and very executable. A requirement to demonstrate the wing spar can actually support the expected flight loads (plus a safety factor), and a requirement to demonstrate that a multi engine plane can maintain directional control on the ground with the critical engine failed?
Neither will prevent 100% of mishaps, but both seem pretty reasonable in light of two total loss mishaps involving a LMA, one of which could quite easily have resulted in serious injuries (remember all those people diving for safety?).
What's wrong with changing the LMA inspection standard to address those two specific mishap causal factors? Seems to me they're reasonable, rational, and very executable. A requirement to demonstrate the wing spar can actually support the expected flight loads (plus a safety factor), and a requirement to demonstrate that a multi engine plane can maintain directional control on the ground with the critical engine failed?
Neither will prevent 100% of mishaps, but both seem pretty reasonable in light of two total loss mishaps involving a LMA, one of which could quite easily have resulted in serious injuries (remember all those people diving for safety?).
Let me guess, you're not going to answer and then I'm not going to answer and you'll say see....you won't answer. I've read that somewhere already.
I'll make you a deal, we'll try to reach a compromise. You tell me how we stop all future accidents and I'll answer any reasonable question you have.
07-26-2016, 06:46 PM
#497
Ok. I see the logic now. You won't support two changes to the LMA inspection program to prevent some future mishaps because neither will prevent all future mishaps.
I'm sure glad you weren't in charge of auto safety. For we'd never have seat belts, because although they prevent some loss of life, they don't prevent all loss of life. Similarly, we'd not have anti-lock brakes, for while they prevent some crashes, they don't prevent all crashes. And what about those backup sensors? Yep, we wouldn't have them either. For while they prevent some accidents, they won't prevent all backing accidents.
Or in aircraft, we wouldn't have a rule that requires single pilots flying IFR to be switched to departure before takeoff. For while it prevents some vertigo accidents on takeoff, it doesn't prevent all takeoff accidents.
Or in our homes, we wouldn't have a rule that requires smoke detectors in new construction, for while they prevent some deaths due to smoke inhalation, they don't prevent all deaths due to smoke inhalation. Or rules that require specific sizes and pitch for stairs, for while they prevent some falls, they don't prevent all falls.
Or in construction (OSHA), we wouldn't have rules that require a hard hat. Because while they prevent some injuries from falling objects, they don't prevent all injuries due to falling objects.
So that's the same logic applied elsewhere. We shouldn't do anything to prevent some mishaps, because what we are doing won't prevent all mishaps? Really?
Last edited by franklin_m; 07-26-2016 at 07:16 PM.
07-26-2016, 07:09 PM
#498
More disingenuous spin, there was a time when I thought this was beneath the point of discussion, but I guess not. Dishonorable really. Here was my full quote for context
It was probably the crash at Warbirds over Delaware with the Mac Hodges B-29 crash. No injuries, just property damage.
I don't think anyone is against safety measures or anything reasonable that would help to stop injury or damage. There is however only so much that can be done. An FAA inspection doesn't guarantee that a scale plane won't crash, for a number of reasons. The degree that we should go, or the AMA, or the FAA perhaps is this issue (and the costs associated with that).
Incidentally, WOD just wrapped up last week, saw some great videos from it, no crashes that I'm aware of.
So i see the new drumbeat is showing how I said "there is however only so much that can be done". Have at it I guess, it will go over about as well as the other one frothing at the mouth about Chris allegedly calling AMA members thieves and being dishonest etc blah etc. Weak, transparent, empty diversionary tactics.
"there is however only so much that can be done" is a statement of obvious fact, unable really to be disproved. Nothing you or any other safety minded person, or service member former or current, or accident reconstruction expert can every say something to prove that wrong. Actually, nothing any of you have said, or even suggested yet show otherwise. Accepting that is nothing short of accepting reality. Living in a fantasy world, a world where there are a billion rules and regs are in place won't change that.
Short of not flying, there is really nothing you are anyone else can do to stop accidents and possible damage to person or property. If you or anyone else here had the solution, you sure wouldn't be here talking about it.
There is no perfect system or process in this world, other than death I suppose.
You can puff your chest out and proclaim how proud you are to be part of an organization that doesn't tolerate any mishap, but the reality is they have to accept the fact that it does happen. Nothing you or they can do to totally rule that out.
So ya, there is however only so much that can be done.
It was probably the crash at Warbirds over Delaware with the Mac Hodges B-29 crash. No injuries, just property damage.
I don't think anyone is against safety measures or anything reasonable that would help to stop injury or damage. There is however only so much that can be done. An FAA inspection doesn't guarantee that a scale plane won't crash, for a number of reasons. The degree that we should go, or the AMA, or the FAA perhaps is this issue (and the costs associated with that).
Incidentally, WOD just wrapped up last week, saw some great videos from it, no crashes that I'm aware of.
So i see the new drumbeat is showing how I said "there is however only so much that can be done". Have at it I guess, it will go over about as well as the other one frothing at the mouth about Chris allegedly calling AMA members thieves and being dishonest etc blah etc. Weak, transparent, empty diversionary tactics.
"there is however only so much that can be done" is a statement of obvious fact, unable really to be disproved. Nothing you or any other safety minded person, or service member former or current, or accident reconstruction expert can every say something to prove that wrong. Actually, nothing any of you have said, or even suggested yet show otherwise. Accepting that is nothing short of accepting reality. Living in a fantasy world, a world where there are a billion rules and regs are in place won't change that.
Short of not flying, there is really nothing you are anyone else can do to stop accidents and possible damage to person or property. If you or anyone else here had the solution, you sure wouldn't be here talking about it.
There is no perfect system or process in this world, other than death I suppose.
You can puff your chest out and proclaim how proud you are to be part of an organization that doesn't tolerate any mishap, but the reality is they have to accept the fact that it does happen. Nothing you or they can do to totally rule that out.
So ya, there is however only so much that can be done.
to say that because "there is only so much that can be done", we should just accept that things will happen and keep on going is a rather ignorant and somewhat naive way to look at things.
07-26-2016, 07:12 PM
#499
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
Ok. I see the logic now. You won't support two changes to the LMA inspection program to prevent some future mishaps because neither will prevent all future mishaps.
I'm sure glad you weren't in charge of auto safety. For we'd never have seat belts, because although they prevent some loss of life, they don't prevent all loss of life. Similarly, we'd not have anti-lock brakes, for while they prevent some crashes, they don't prevent all crashes. And what about those backup sensors? Yep, we would have them either. For while they prevent some accidents, they won't prevent all backing accidents.
Or in aircraft, we wouldn't have a rule that requires single pilots flying IFR to be switched to departure before takeoff. For while it prevents some vertigo accidents on takeoff, it doesn't prevent all takeoff accidents.
Or in our homes, we wouldn't have a rule that requires smoke detectors in new construction, for while they prevent some deaths due to smoke inhalation, they don't prevent all deaths due to smoke inhalation. Or rules that require specific sizes and pitch for stairs, for while they prevent some falls, they don't prevent all falls.
Or in construction (OSHA). We wouldn't have rules that require a hard hat, because while they prevent some injuries from falling objects, they don't prevent all injuries due to falling objects.
So that's the same logic applied elsewhere. We shouldn't do anything to prevent some mishaps, because what we are doing won't prevent all mishaps? Really?
I'm sure glad you weren't in charge of auto safety. For we'd never have seat belts, because although they prevent some loss of life, they don't prevent all loss of life. Similarly, we'd not have anti-lock brakes, for while they prevent some crashes, they don't prevent all crashes. And what about those backup sensors? Yep, we would have them either. For while they prevent some accidents, they won't prevent all backing accidents.
Or in aircraft, we wouldn't have a rule that requires single pilots flying IFR to be switched to departure before takeoff. For while it prevents some vertigo accidents on takeoff, it doesn't prevent all takeoff accidents.
Or in our homes, we wouldn't have a rule that requires smoke detectors in new construction, for while they prevent some deaths due to smoke inhalation, they don't prevent all deaths due to smoke inhalation. Or rules that require specific sizes and pitch for stairs, for while they prevent some falls, they don't prevent all falls.
Or in construction (OSHA). We wouldn't have rules that require a hard hat, because while they prevent some injuries from falling objects, they don't prevent all injuries due to falling objects.
So that's the same logic applied elsewhere. We shouldn't do anything to prevent some mishaps, because what we are doing won't prevent all mishaps? Really?
I'll accept anything reasonable that cuts down on damages of any type. Have yet to say anything contrary to that, not withstanding your comments above. I haven't said what are you claiming, at this point you just appear to be lying, intentionally misstating what I said, or just misunderstand. I hate to feel that way, but this appears to be where we are going, regrettably.
Nothing you've shown so far indicates there isn't more work to be done, which is really another way of saying there is only so much that can be done.
07-26-2016, 07:19 PM
#500
Banned
My Feedback: (8)
none of the above makes it "OK" for anyone to stop trying to get something done to make things safer. which is,i think, Franklin's main point. there is no excuse for not trying to improve the safety of what we are doing.
to say that because "there is only so much that can be done", we should just accept that things will happen and keep on going is a rather ignorant and somewhat naive way to look at things.
to say that because "there is only so much that can be done", we should just accept that things will happen and keep on going is a rather ignorant and somewhat naive way to look at things.