Flyfalcons

Pilot error is still the main cause of most accidents today. A company with the proper safety and training systems in place such as a well-run ASAP program (started by unions) and a committment from both the pilots and company to work together in constantly looking to improve the training program will go a long ways to minimize pilot error-related accidents. Humans are not infallable so errors will occur but through proper training we can cut them down to a minimum. The introduction of CRM and LOFT training has done wonders to improve safety, but we still have further to go. Many 135 carriers including my own are using the "check the box" method for recurrent training, which really does very little to improve safety. We are working our way toward AQP training so more effort can be focued on real-world threat and error management scenarios. Numerous 121 carriers (with a far higher percentage of unionized pilots I might add) have already gone to AQP training, and the safety record of the 121 carriers is much higher than 135 and 91. In fact it is even more important for 135 operators to continually seek to improve pilot training due to the much greater variety of situations that on-demand pilots face. We are getting there but there is room to improve. Having said all of that I will not pass judgement onto the pilots of the Colgan crash until the NTSB has completed their investigation.

Captainbob

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Flyfalcons. Here is a quote from the current president of the Flight Safety Foundation:

“Proactive safety management is built on a foundation of commitment and trust. If we lose that trust, the information flow ceases and we are condemned to wait for the next incident or accident. Trust is a difficult thing to maintain in the U.S. aviation environment. The industry and the regulator have been through difficult times and labor relations are strained. The Flight Safety Foundation takes no position on the political debates, but we do issue one caution: the debates between management and labor in this industry must never be allowed to compromise the free flow of safety information in the system. If information stops flowing from the cockpit, the ramp or the control room floor, risk will be needlessly increased.�

Your honor, though noble, is misplaced. It reminds me of the “honor� of the young gang member who says-we don’t narc on our own . It’s the same ogre that haunts the medical field which has so adroitly for many years protected incompetent doctors. It’s that same management/labor struggle that Mr Voss talks about above. It stifles the free flow of information and hampers the advancement of aviation safety.


I, for one, don’t share your reservation about “naming names�. I call ‘em like I see ‘em!

Flyfalcons

You can call them however you want but you cannot argue the safety of an ASAP program. The reason that a couple carriers recently closed their ASAP programs was because the company was using information gathered in the ASAP programs to discipline flight crews. With that type of abuse of the program, the pilots have no choice but to rescend their involvement in their ASAP. The intent of the ASAP program is to facilitate open communications and mutually work together to improve safety. This cannot happen if the company is violating the pilots' trust. I take it your company does not have an ASAP program?

As far as "naming names" - a friend of mine said it best. This is the time when professional "experts" run their mouths, and expert professionals let the investigation take its course.

UltraBob

Here's an interesting story on the Schipol/Turkish Airlines accident.


http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener.../ALT030509.xml


CRM, systems knowledge, good judgement.... all admirable goals.
Integrating these with automation is something that's becoming more and more of an issue.



Bob

Captainbob

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Yes, I read that. No amount of automation can or should be allowed to substitute for crew situational awareness. What professional pilot would allow or accept an airspeed on final that is 40 kts low! iT'S not the fault of the equipment ,it was an unstabilised approach that caused this accident. Short final is not the place for crew training.

Captainbob

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Hey flyfalcons and stuntman.
You guys seem to be pretty quiet lately. Did you see the front page of USA Today...today.

I hate it when I'm right..........but then someone's got to do it.

Flyfalcons

We've been quiet because we've been letting the NTSB do their jobs instead of speculating. You must work for a pretty awesome 135 outfit to be all-knowing. I didn't realize it was a game to see who was right when so many people died?

doubledee

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C,c,can't we all j,j,just get along?

Captainbob

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To all,

The NTSB stated yesterday that it was likely crew error that caused the Dash-8 accident in Buffalo. After the stick shaker went off the pilot overreacted and pulled back on the yoke stalling the airplane.

bbjpilot

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Excellent thread!

Both Cpt. Bob and Stuntflyer make excellent points.In this scenario, I would look at Colgan Air(which is regulated by FAR 121 now by the way). Not in regards to Training, but Standards! I saw it first hand, with another carrier,pilots upgrading because they had the #'s, not the level ofexperience, the knowledge(or lack there of)! Which system is broken, the one regulating or operating.
Perhaps the carriers should take a lesson from UAL, don't upgrade the pilot if he doesn't perform! Perhaps a lifetime co-pilot isn't a bad idea! Never liked the idea, I figured if they couldn't upgrade we didn't need them