Those heavy tanks were part of a heavy tank project T-28-34 from 1943-48 with the primary purpose of the invasion of the Japanese homeland.
Hi,
Outstanding. Sounds like you are into some cool and interesting restoration tank work. No disagreement on the design fate of US "to" heavies and why:
But the heavy tanks pictured above, initially, had a different design purpose and rather than serving in the Pacific they where concepted and developed to fight against German armor, but rightly opposed by ETO armor combat leadership (and Island Japan isn't exactly tank fighting country).
After the 1944 Roer and the Ardennes tank duals, the use of heavies was again debated for service in the ETO. It was a big political drama back in the day, and well before our time. (LOL).
If interested read on:
"Shortly before the drive into Germany, the American press broke the story that American tanks were inferior to those of the enemy.
Hanson W. Baldwin in the New York Times and the editor of the Washington Post demanded to be told why; and the story traveled to Europe. Questioned by American correspondents at a press conference in mid-March 1945, General Patton publicly defended American tanks. He also wrote a letter to Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff, which the War Department released to the American papers, stating that while the Tiger would destroy the Sherman head on, the Sherman could usually manage to attack from the rear and avoid a slugging match; moreover, the Sherman was incomparably more reliable and long-lived, as well as easier to ship and handle, than the Tiger.
Patton wrote the letter because he wanted to stop what he called "the foolish criticism" of American tanks which he believed was having a bad effect on the morale of the soldiers at the front (of course German tank crews where mostly responsible for the bad effect on US Troop morale and the 75mm, thinned skinned Sherman was not to highly thought of either by that point in the war).
But privately he (Patton) had stated to a visiting Ordnance officer, just, after the Battle of the Bulge, "Ordnance takes too God Damn long seeking perfection at the expense of the fighting men, and you can tell that to anyone at Ordnance."
The officer believed that Patton was expressing the feelings of the using arms. It was natural enough for the tankers at the front to blame Ordnance for the heavy casualties they had suffered fighting in the Shermans (Roer terrain negated the Sherman's successful previous tactics and they payed a heavy price in a slugging dual).
Key Point:
Who was to blame? The Army Ground Forces New Developments Division criticized Ordnance for spending too much time on developing and promoting the T23 tank with the electrical transmission, which was not wanted, (and developing) the heavy tanks M6, T28, T29, and T30, which the AGF had turned down repeatedly because of road and bridge limitations in Euorpe (would have faced the same mobility problems in Japan too).
General Barnes and Colonel Colby maintained that the best American tank of the war, the Pershing, had been developed in the face of "bitter opposition" by the using arms. Colby believed that if AGF had given the go-ahead early enough, the Pershing could have been available in quantities for the beachhead landings on D-day; and the record supports his belief."
My 2 cents. Basically, back in the day (1940's), the US armored forces believed that the US tank designers had wasted their time on these heavy vehicles, initially designed for the ETO, and fortunately not needed (for many reasons), but none the less the "US armor design directions or missed directions" cost the lives of many a good Sherman crew because the responsible design and management and combat leaders could NOT agree on what approach to take for a successful tank design to go up against the Germans in the ETO.
For continued and more official US Army Ordnance History fun reading go to: (
http://www.history.army.mil/books/ww...apterXVII.html)
Enjoy, John