The defense of the TSA would be a valid argument if they were a highly trained and specialized security force. It also help if they had or were able to use common sense. Their track record has proven otherwise:

Here are prime examples of how ineffective the TSA is: (the second part of the article they missed a gun)

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/loaded...ry?id=12412458

Here is another recent TSA shinning security moment; http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/01...ng-around.html

The reality is of the last 39 thwarted terrorist attacks post 9/11 (that are public record), the TSA has not been involved in any of them.

http://www.heritage.org/research/rep...uccess-stories

This is from that same article.
Lesson # 9: Current Aviation Security Is Expensive and Largely Inconsequential. Since 9/11, not a single one of the 39 foiled plots was stopped because of physical security measures at U.S. airports. In fact, one of the three successful terrorist plots was a shooting at a ticket counter at LAX airport in Los Angeles. Despite this fact, Congress has poured billions of taxpayer dollars into the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screening line and toward physical hardening of airports. For much of the first decade after 9/11, this was mostly tolerated by the American public as an inconvenience associated with flying. This included such measures as the often confusing “3-1-1” liquids rule after the liquid-explosives plot in 2006 (foiled plot 17), and forcing passengers to take off their shoes for screening after the Richard Reid plot in 2001 (foiled plot 1).

The growing nuisance of traveling, however, as well as a recent decision by the TSA to force passengers to undergo either a full-body scan or a physical pat down by a TSA agent, have propelled aviation security to the forefront of public debate. The Administration, for its part, has emphasized that this change was initiated because the Christmas Day would-be bomber was able to smuggle explosives, located in his underwear, through a foreign airport checkpoint and that the metal-detector technology deployed in primary screening would have been incapable of finding the explosive and type possessed by Abdulmutallab had he come through a U.S. airport.

Deploying new technologies to meet the threats the nation faces should be encouraged. However, a need to spend money on new technologies is the wrong lesson to draw from the Christmas Day plot. The real lesson can be found in all 39 plots that have been foiled since 9/11: that information sharing and intelligence are absolute cornerstones of effective counterterrorism—not wholesale screening of travelers. The Christmas Day plot in particular demonstrated failures by the Departments of State and Homeland Security to share information and sufficiently connect the intelligence dots. Despite a personal visit from Abdulmutallab’s father to a U.S. consulate office warning of his son’s potential plans for terrorism, the younger Abdulmutallab’s visa was not revoked nor was there additional follow-up with the National Counterterrorism Center—measures that might have placed him on a “no-fly” list and stopped him from boarding the plane in the first place.

Its true their lack of specialized training, common sense and need for political correctness has allowed them to violate everyone equally and thouroughly. Perhaps this has exhausted them so much that they miss the real threats

According to one report, undercover TSA agents testing security at a Newark airport terminal on one day in 2006 found that TSA screeners failed to detect concealed bombs and guns 20 out of 22 times. A 2007 government audit leaked to USA Today revealed that undercover agents were successful slipping simulated explosives and bomb parts through Los Angeles's LAX airport in 50 out of 70 attempts, and at Chicago's O'Hare airport agents made 75 attempts and succeeded in getting through undetected 45 times.

Thats a track record Barney fife and Andy could easily beat.