This is the article referred to above:

Doomed: THE REAL STORY OF FLIGHT 4590

David Rose

It is an indelible image, heavy with symbolism: the photograph taken on 25 July 2000, at the moment Concorde became a technological Icarus. The great white bird rears up over runway 26 at Charles de Gaulle, immediately after takeoff. Already mortally wounded, flames bleed uncontrollably from beneath the left-hand wing. Less than two minutes later, the world’s only supersonic airliner will fling itself into the Paris suburb of Gonesse, killing all 109 on board and another five on the ground.
The official investigation has focused almost entirely on the fire. According to the French accident investigation bureau, the BEA, it broke out when the plane passed over a strip of metal on the runway. A tyre burst; a chunk of rubber thudded into a fuel tank inside the wing; jet fuel poured out of a hole and ignited.
The hot gases caused two of the engines to falter, and despite a valiant struggle by Captain Christian Marty, a daredevil skier who once crossed the Atlantic on a windsurf board, the loss of thrust made the crash inevitable.
An investigation by The Observer suggests the truth is much more complicated. In the words of John Hutchinson, a Concorde captain for 15 years, the fire on its own should have been “eminently survivable; the pilot should have been able to fly his way out of trouble.” The reason why he failed to do so, Hutchinson believes, was a lethal combination of operational error and negligence. This appears to have been a crash with more than one contributing factor, most of which were avoidable.
Go back to that photograph. An amazing picture: but where was it taken? The answer is: inside an Air France Boeing 747 which had just landed from Japan , and was waiting to cross Concorde’s runway on its way back to the terminal. Its passengers included Jacques Chirac and his wife, the President and first lady of France , returning from the G7 summit.
Concorde looks to be nearby because it had been close to hitting the 747, an event which would have turned both aircraft into a giant fireball. Veering wildly to the left, like a recalcitrant supermarket trolley with a jammed wheel, Concorde’s undercarriage had locked askew.
When Marty pulled back on the control column to raise the nose and take to the air — the process pilots call “rotation” — the plane’s airspeed was only 188 knots, 11 knots below the minimum recommended velocity required for this manoeuvre.
But he had no choice: the plane was about to leave the tarmac altogether and plough into the soft and bumpy grass at its side. That might have ripped off the landing gear, leaving Concorde to overturn and blow up on its own. If not, the 747 lay straight ahead. So he took to the air, although he knew he was travelling too slowly, which would impair the damaged plane’s chances of survival.
Shocking evidence now emerging suggests that the Air France Concorde F-BTSC had not been properly maintained. The airline’s ground staff had failed to replace a “spacer” — a vital component of the landing gear which keeps the wheels in proper alignment. Although the BEA disputes it, there is compelling evidence that it was the missing spacer which may have caused the plane to skew to the left, so forcing Marty to leave the ground too early.
At the same time, the plane was operating outside its legally certified limits. When it stood at the end of the runway, ready to roll, it was more than six tonnes over its approved maximum takeoff weight for the given conditions, with its centre of gravity pushed dangerously far to the rear. Even before the blowout, Marty was already pushing the envelope.
The stresses on Concorde’s landing gear are unusually severe. At regular intervals, the various load-bearing components become “lifed” and must be replaced. When the undercarriage bogeys are taken apart and reassembled, the work must be done according to a rigid formula, and rigorously inspected and assessed.
Concorde F-BTSC went into the hangar at Charles de Gaulle on 18 July, a week before the crash. The part which was lifed was the left undercarriage beam — the horizontal tube through which the two wheel axles pass at each end. In the middle is a low-friction pivot which connects the beam to the vertical leg extending down from inside the wing. The bits of the pivot which bear the load are two steel shear bushes. To keep them in position, they are separated by the spacer: a piece of grey, anodised aluminium about five inches in diameter and twelve inches long. When the plane left the hangar on 21 July, the spacer was missing. After the crash, it was found in the Air France workshop, still attached to the old beam which had been replaced.
In the days before the accident, the aircraft flew to New York and back twice. At first, the load-bearing shear bushes remained in the right positions. But the right-hand bush began to slip, down into the gap where there should have been a spacer. By the day of the crash, it had moved about seven inches, until the two washers were almost touching. Instead of being held firmly in a snug-fitting pivot, the beam and the wheels were wobbling, with about three degrees of movement possible in any direction. As the plane taxied to the start of the runway, there was nothing to keep the front wheels of the undercarriage in line with the back. The supermarket trolley was ready to jam.
Exactly when it started to do so is uncertain. Jean-Marie Chauve, who flew Concordes with Air France until his retirement, and Michel Suaud, for many years a Concorde flight engineer, believe the undercarriage was already out of alignment when the plane began to move down the runway..
They have spent the past six months preparing a 60-page report on the crash. Chauve said: “The acceleration was abnormally slow from the start. There was something retarding the aircraft, holding it back.” Chauve and Suaud’s report contains detailed calculations which conclude that without this retardation, the plane would have taken off 1,694 metres from the start of the runway — before reaching the fateful metal strip.
The BEA contests these findings, saying that the acceleration was normal until the tyre burst. It also maintains that even after the blowout, the missing spacer was insignificant.
The BEA’s critics say that once the tyre burst, the load on the three remaining tyres became uneven, and even if the wheels had been more or less straight before, they now twisted disastrously to the side. The smoking gun is a remarkable series of photographs in the BEA’s own preliminary report. They show unmistakably the skid marks of four tyres, heading off the runway on to its concrete shoulder, almost reaching the rough grass beyond.
In one picture, the foreground depicts a smashed yellow steel landing light on the very edge of the made-up surface, which was clipped by the aircraft as Marty tried to wrest it into the air. Industry sources have confirmed that this probably had further, damaging results. Until then the number one engine had been functioning almost normally but when the plane hit the landing light it ingested hard material which caused it to surge and fail. This hard material, the sources say, was probably parts of the broken light.
John Hutchinson said: “The blowout alone would not cause these marks. You’d get intermittent blobs from flapping rubber, but these are very clearly skids.”
In its interim report, and in a statement, the BEA said that the leftwards yaw was caused not by the faulty landing gear but by “the loss of thrust from engines one and two”.
There are several problems with this analysis. First, as the BEA’s own published data reveals, the thrust from engine one was almost normal until the end of the skid, when it took in the parts of the landing light. It is simply not true that the yaw began when both engines failed.
Second, those who fly the plane say that a loss of engine power will not cause an uncontrollable yaw. The Observerhas spoken to five former and serving Concorde captains and flying officers. All have repeatedly experienced the loss of an engine shortly before takeoff in the computerised Concorde training simulator; one of them, twice, has done so for real. All agree, in John Hutchinson’s words, “It’s no big deal at all. You’re not using anything like the full amount of rudder to keep the plane straight; the yaw is totally containable.”
Other avoidable factors were further loading the dice, making it still more difficult to rescue the plane. When Marty paused at the start of the runway, his instruments told him that his Concorde had 1.2 tonnes of extra fuel which should have been burnt during the taxi. In addition, it contained 19 bags of luggage which were not included on the manifest, and had been loaded at the last minute, weighing a further 500 kg. These took the total mass to about 186 tonnes — a tonne above the aircraft’s certified maximum structural weight.
Meanwhile, in the interval between Concorde’s leaving the terminal and reaching the start of the runway, something very important had changed: the wind. It had been still. Now, as the control tower told Marty, he had an eight-knot tailwind. The first thing pilots learn is that one takes off against the wind. Yet as the voice record makes clear, Marty and his crew seemed not to react to this information at all.
Had they paused for a moment, they might have recomputed the data on which they had planned their takeoff. If they had, they would have learnt a very worrying fact. The tailwind meant that Concorde’s runway-allowable takeoff weight was just 180 tonnes — at least six tonnes less than the weight of Flight 4590.
[NOTE: What the reporter is saying here is that once the tailwind was accounted for, the plane was now six tons above the takeoff limit for that runway.]
John Hutchinson said: “The change in the wind was an incredible revelation, and no one says anything. Marty should have done the sums and told the tower, ‘Hang on, we’ve got to redo our calculations.’”
The extra weight had a further consequence beyond simply making it harder to get into the air. It shifted the centre of gravity backwards: the extra bags almost certainly went into the rear hold, and all the extra fuel was in the rearmost tank.
A plane’s centre of gravity is expressed as a percentage: so many per cent fore or aft. Brian Trubshaw and John Cochrane, Concorde’s two test pilots when the aircraft was being developed in the early 1970s, set the aft operating limit at 54 per cent — beyond that, they found, it risked becoming uncontrollable, likely to rear up backwards and crash, exactly as Flight 4590 did in its final moments over Gonesse.
The doomed plane’s centre of gravity went beyond 54 per cent. The BEA states a figure of 54.2 per cent. A senior industry source, who cannot be named for contractual reasons, says the true figure may have been worse: with the extra fuel and bags, it may have been up to 54.6 per cent. And as the fuel gushed from the hole in the forward tank, the centre of gravity moved still further back.
When the plane was just 25 feet off the ground, Gilles Jardinaud, the flight engineer, shut down the ailing number two engine. Both French and British pilots say it was another disastrous mistake, which breached all set procedures. The engine itself was not on fire, and as the tank emptied and the fire burnt itself out, it would probably have recovered. The fixed drill for shutting down an engine requires the crew to wait until the flight is stable at 400 feet, and to do so then only on a set of commands from the captain.
In a comment which might be applied to the whole unfolding tragedy, John Hutchinson said: “Discipline had broken down. The captain doesn’t know what’s happening; the co-pilot doesn’t know; it’s a shambles.”
Previous reports of the tragedy have described the crash as an act of God, a freak occurrence which exposed a fatal structural weakness in the aircraft which could have appeared at any time. The investigation by The Observer suggests the truth may not only be more complicated, but also sadder, more sordid. Men, not God, caused Concorde to crash, and their omissions and errors may have turned an escapable mishap into catastrophe.
The issues raised by David Rose, which at first were dismissed as so much conspiracy mongering, are now generally accepted facts within the aviation community, and have been more or less confirmed by investigators, however quietly. The November, 2012 court ruling does not explicitly says so, but it is, in its own way, a tacit acknowledgment of the fullstory — one in which Continental Airlines played at worst a supporting role. This accident is an outstanding example of something we’ve seen time and time again in airplane crashes: multiple errors, none of them necessarily fatal on their own accord, combining and compounding at the worst possible moment to precipitate a catastrophe. Rarely is the cause of disaster something simple and unambiguous.
Both British Airways and Air France, the only two operators of the Concorde, grounded their fleets following the 2000 disaster. The planes were reintroduced following a fuel-tank redesign, but both carriers withdrew them from service permanently in 2003, after 27 years of service, citing prohibitively expensive operating and upkeep costs. Only twenty Concordes had been built, four of which were prototypes or pre-production examples. The Air France crash marked its only fatal accident.
Concorde, as you may or may not know, was not the only supersonic passenger aircraft. There was also its Soviet cousin, the Tupolev Tu-144, which also suffered a single fatal accident over the brief course of its commercial tenure. In 1973 a Tu-144 crashed during a demonstration at the Paris Air Show. The Tupolev had taken off from Le Bourget airport, where Captain Marty and his crew were attempting an emergency landing when their Concorde went down in 2000.
DEFINITELY give this one a read!! And the attached article by Patrick Smith.
Concorde



Excerpt from the Travel Insider newsletter


The Real Truth of Air France’s Concorde Disaster

The French have this strange approach whereby, in an accident, they like to find someone to blame and bring a criminal prosecution against them.
Never mind that the key part of an accident is the lack of what the attorneys would term mens rea – the lack of a specific decision on the part of someone to create the accident. If an accident was intentional, it wouldn’t be an accident, would it. But the French like to find someone they can blame.
Never mind also that when there is criminal prosecution being threatened, people tend to clam up and stop being fully open and truthful about what happened, which means it becomes harder to learn from the innocent and unfortunate mistakes and chain of events that may have caused any such accident. This is why, just about everywhere else in the world, air accidents in particular are investigated without the threat of criminal prosecution hanging over the heads of the involved parties.
Oh – the French also being the ardent nationalists that they are, any attempt to shift blame from French companies and individuals, and to pass it over to foreigners instead (ideally Americans, British, or Germans) is eagerly sought. This can sometimes be difficult to do – for example the AF 449 crash over the Atlantic a couple of years ago, involving Air France (obviously French), its pilots (also French) and an Airbus plane (also, ooops, mainly French).
So with all this as background, do you remember the terrible tragedy of the Air France Concorde that crashed when taking off from Paris back in 2000? After casting around, the French decided that clearly the fault for the crash of an Air France (French) Concorde (half French) piloted by French pilots and leaving from a French airport should be blamed on Continental Airlines, a nasty American company.
The logic of that is rather breathtaking, and involved a very selective inattention to most of the relevant details of the disaster. The story went that a Continental DC-10 that took off shortly before the Concorde had a piece of metal fall off and lie on the runway, which became the root cause of the Concorde disaster. The Concorde apparently rolled over the top of the metal piece, which apparently then punctured a tire, and bits of rubber flew off the tire and into a fuel tank, starting a fire.
At least this was better than their earlier attempt to prosecute, and if successful, imprison an 80 yr old gentleman who was the original designers of the Concorde, who had been in charge of the plane’s initial testing program more than 40 years before the crash.
The successful prosecution of Continental has now been semi-overturned in a French Appeals court, which has at least absolved Continental of criminal liability, while still imposing a very small (€1 million) measure of civil liability. Indeed, the amount is so ridiculously small, compared to the cost to Air France of losing a Concorde full of passengers, that it begs the question ‘why so little’? It is almost as though the court is saying ‘Okay, the honor of France is at stake, so we’ll find you guilty, but don’t worry, we’ll just impose the tiniest of fines’.
If Continental truly was guilty, surely its fine, for the loss of a plane and the death of 113 people, should have been more like €250 million.
Details here.
However, none of this relates to the real true full story of how and why the Concorde crashed. It is a story worth telling, because it reveals sad negligence and incompetence on the part of – gulp – French people in many different parts of the tragedy.
I’d found an article about this, many years ago, and even mentioned it in passing in earlier commentaries on the accident, but lost the link and couldn’t find it again, no matter how hard I searched. So great thanks to ‘Ask the Pilot’ blogger Patrick Smith, who now shares this excellent must-read article.

Not to steal the story from Patrick and the sources he draws from, but the spectacular fire was not fatal. It was something the pilots should have been able to recover from. Now go read his story to find out the multiple problems with the plane to start with, and the ineptness of the pilots’ responses after the fire started and how the combination of these factors, rather than the fire, caused the plane’s destruction.
Excuse me for maybe having a misplaced set of priorities, but to me the biggest tragedy of all about the unnecessary and preventable Air France Concorde crash was not just the death of 113 people and the loss of an irreplaceable Concorde. It was that this crash ended the aura of the Concorde’s impeccable safety record and claimed highest standards of everything; and – in my opinion – was the underlying root cause of the Concordes being unnecessarily taken out of service only a few years after they were returned to service after the crash. Indeed, Air France ’s embarrassment was so great that it reportedly never wished to operate them again after their accident.
Do read Patrick Smith’s very clear explanation of what went wrong, and how easily preventable the entire tragedy could have and should have been.