I am new to tanks and am building the Tamiya full option Pershing. Other than the olive green where can I find other colors that they have been painted.

You need to research the Korean War to find answers to your question.

For decals: http://www.peddinghaus-decals.de/ind...emart&Itemid=1

They were painted Olive Drab, same color as WWII. Often referred to US Quartermaster Number 22, Olive Drab Number 9, and A/N 319. 3 colors, one name. By 1956 it had a new name, 34087. This refers to Lusterless Olive Drab, not the later semi-gloss OD.

If you're doing a Zebra Mission, WW2 Pershing, some of them had wide bands of black for camouflage.

The HL Pershing is a korean War era model and the color is fairly close. (Army) If you want to take it back to WW II, there are some modification that should be made as well as a repaint...Model Master`1911 is a good color. Korean War colors, both in uniform and vehicles were a bit greener than WW II, although many vehicles did retain the older colors until they were pulled in for complete overhaul. Cold war got even greener into Vietnam with many changes being made in color combinations until the final NATO green went world wide.

Swathdiver mentioned operation Zebra...this was WW~ II..20 T-26E3 Pershings arrived in Belgium on 9 Feb and committed to battle on 28 March 45. James where did you see any pics of Pershings with black/OD camo? [:-]

PCOMM; Don't know where Pedinghouse got that info, but of all the units engaged in Army Operations Ripper and Killer in April/May 1951, NONE had M-26 Pershings and no Pershing ever wore the tiger markings. Army units had just received the new M-46 Pattons (73d Tk Bn 7 ID & 6th Tk Bn 24 ID) , other vehicles included M-4A3E8s, M-24 Chafees and M-19 Copperheads. Someone a while ago used Jim Meskos "Armor in Korea" book as a reference, but that picture on page 59 shows M-46 Pattons, mislabeled as M-26 Pershings. Pedinghouse decals are of 1st Marine Div, and I do not believe they participted in Killer or Ripper. If anyone has documentation to the contrary, please advise. [&:]

Black-striped Pershing from the memoirs, Another River, Another Town by John P. Irwing.
http://www.amazon.com/Another-River-.../dp/0375759638

.

Don't think that is a paint scheme. Believe more shadow or dirt. I have the book and really enjoyed it, shame there's only the one photo. There wasn't time or real need to paint camo on new tanks at that late stage of the war, as it was long known on both sides how it was ending and the only issue was who would get where the quickest. I have seen some photos of post war Pershings with black/OD camo scheme.....Berlin Brigade company of M-26A1's used it in late 49-50, but camo patterns on M-26s are really scarce. I'd sure like to see some.

Really? Those are some really defined dirt then. Or if it is shadows, notice the shadow didn't affect the tools/impliments...

Hi Vett
If any help a few pics of my M26.
Pete..............

Sorry lads res too low will reset and send Pete............

Hope these are better. Pete.......................

fleshpedler, the is nothing wrong with the first set of pictures that you posted

Thank you for the decal clarification, you saved me a few bucks.

There are several books out there showing a few Pershings in black and OD camo and some in winter white wash (search Amazon or Google), but those are hardly "colors" as I interpreted the threads initial question to be. Just adding a black pattern to OD is still a modeling exercise in rendering a monochromatic hue plus its shades and values.

Off topic (WWII US Armored Officers thought the Pershing was a step in the right direction, but still not a true frontal attack kitty killer), but who said the US didn't have any "real" WWII armored heavy kitty killers? These development vehicles were waiting in the wings and ready for production, but: "Most (ETO) armor commanders were not very much interested in the very heavy T28, T29, and T30 tanks, for they did not see how these tanks could be got over roads and bridges (in Germany).

Bill, the only 2 Pershings I was sure of was the Super Pershing and that one Irwin is standing in front of. Irwin didn't leave the ETO until '46 so it's possible that tank was camouflaged later. There are a couple other photos where the turrets look really dark compared to the hull but those I attribute to dust and dirt. The Super Pershing is the only positive one I guess.

Those heavy tanks were part of a heavy tank project T-28-34 from 1943-48 with the primary purpose of the invasion of the Japanese homeland. Since the bomb ended the war, some of these tanks, like the T-30 you submitted were retained as test vehicles. the T-30 engine pack, Continental V-12 810 HP with Allison CD-850 transmission was used to upgrade the M-26 which became the M-46 Patton. We have one of 4 existing models (out of 8) at Ft Jackson, and I just finished installing a set of periscopes in it. Next week I am going to clean up the rammer mechanism and crane for an article being written here. The T-28 super heavy is the only example of two and it's at knox. The T-30s sister tank, the T-34, developed into the 120mm Gun Heavy tank M-103 which was used by the 33d Armor in Germany and upgraded M-103A5s served longer with the Marines. Danville Tank museum has one of the very rare later models. With the extraordinary weight and severe restrictions on maneuverability, these tanks were never programmed for tank vs tank war in ETO and would have suffered the same fate as the Jagttiger, king tiger and Maus of being resticted to the nearest bridge.

Those heavy tanks were part of a heavy tank project T-28-34 from 1943-48 with the primary purpose of the invasion of the Japanese homeland.

Hi,

Outstanding. Sounds like you are into some cool and interesting restoration tank work. No disagreement on the design fate of US "to" heavies and why:

But the heavy tanks pictured above, initially, had a different design purpose and rather than serving in the Pacific they where concepted and developed to fight against German armor, but rightly opposed by ETO armor combat leadership (and Island Japan isn't exactly tank fighting country).

After the 1944 Roer and the Ardennes tank duals, the use of heavies was again debated for service in the ETO. It was a big political drama back in the day, and well before our time. (LOL).

If interested read on:

"Shortly before the drive into Germany, the American press broke the story that American tanks were inferior to those of the enemy.

Hanson W. Baldwin in the New York Times and the editor of the Washington Post demanded to be told why; and the story traveled to Europe. Questioned by American correspondents at a press conference in mid-March 1945, General Patton publicly defended American tanks. He also wrote a letter to Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff, which the War Department released to the American papers, stating that while the Tiger would destroy the Sherman head on, the Sherman could usually manage to attack from the rear and avoid a slugging match; moreover, the Sherman was incomparably more reliable and long-lived, as well as easier to ship and handle, than the Tiger.

Patton wrote the letter because he wanted to stop what he called "the foolish criticism" of American tanks which he believed was having a bad effect on the morale of the soldiers at the front (of course German tank crews where mostly responsible for the bad effect on US Troop morale and the 75mm, thinned skinned Sherman was not to highly thought of either by that point in the war).

But privately he (Patton) had stated to a visiting Ordnance officer, just, after the Battle of the Bulge, "Ordnance takes too God Damn long seeking perfection at the expense of the fighting men, and you can tell that to anyone at Ordnance."

The officer believed that Patton was expressing the feelings of the using arms. It was natural enough for the tankers at the front to blame Ordnance for the heavy casualties they had suffered fighting in the Shermans (Roer terrain negated the Sherman's successful previous tactics and they payed a heavy price in a slugging dual).

Key Point:

Who was to blame? The Army Ground Forces New Developments Division criticized Ordnance for spending too much time on developing and promoting the T23 tank with the electrical transmission, which was not wanted, (and developing) the heavy tanks M6, T28, T29, and T30, which the AGF had turned down repeatedly because of road and bridge limitations in Euorpe (would have faced the same mobility problems in Japan too).

General Barnes and Colonel Colby maintained that the best American tank of the war, the Pershing, had been developed in the face of "bitter opposition" by the using arms. Colby believed that if AGF had given the go-ahead early enough, the Pershing could have been available in quantities for the beachhead landings on D-day; and the record supports his belief."

My 2 cents. Basically, back in the day (1940's), the US armored forces believed that the US tank designers had wasted their time on these heavy vehicles, initially designed for the ETO, and fortunately not needed (for many reasons), but none the less the "US armor design directions or missed directions" cost the lives of many a good Sherman crew because the responsible design and management and combat leaders could NOT agree on what approach to take for a successful tank design to go up against the Germans in the ETO.

For continued and more official US Army Ordnance History fun reading go to: (http://www.history.army.mil/books/ww...apterXVII.html)

Enjoy, John

John, thanks for the bio on the heavy tank debate. I have read most of it before and must agree, if Patton hadn't been so hard-ass about keeping all the potent gun guns for his failed-concept TDs we would have had the Pershing in action at least a year earlier. I read a lot while I was doing 4 yrs of research on the 6 TD units that were here at Ft Jackson. On the T-28-34 project, I only know what I have read in Dick Hunnicutt's books and discussion with the Fisher Tank plant. Harldy anyone ever mentions the initial old T-1/M6 heavy, which was just a huge upgunned Sherman design which really wouldn't have done much good given the weak armament and overall flat design. I;ve tjouight a couple times about making a 1;16 RC~model of a T-30, but that huge turret would be a monster job and would have to be made of a piece of resin. On an RC~battle field , it would be nearly indestructable.

Thanks for the links on further reading. I will check them out. I'm at Ft Jackson Museum as a volunteer but spend 8-9 hrs there on Thursdays graduation/family day to guide people though and answer questions on the equipment, so as in modelling and diorama work, I want to be correct. Wish I could get the OK and get a couple of our tanks running.
The E8 Sherman and one of the Pershings would be good candidates and all the M-41 would need is droping in a power pack and a cleanup. But, Army museum policy is the same,
ignorant mindset of money-liability, so paint it and let it rot. Nice to read something from someone on the web that is informed.
Bill

Pattoncommander, (off topic)

the latch to the box on the left side of your M4A3E8 (ft jackson), just aft the driver's hatch is broken; found it laying on the asphalt out front of the tank... museum was closed so i put it on the fender beneath the box a few weeks ago.

cs

Thanks....so much gets broken or just ripped off, it's hard to keep anything intact. I haven't seen the latch....but will look inside...maybe someone stuck it in there. thats a binocular case for infantry to guide the gunner to a specific target. Later models had tham at the rear, by the intercom phone. Thanks for helping.
Bill

I wouldn't blame Patton as much as the devleopment guys for being too slow to get things approved and moving forward. If they'd done things with more urgency the Pershing may have been in combat by the fall of '44 in time for the Battle of the Bulge.

76mm Shermans were available in April '44 though none landed on D-Day. It wasn't until they clashed with Tigers and Panthers en mass that they began to clamor for them in July '44. Funny, the guys in Italy knew all about the advantages of the 76mm Sherman and were using them already. NIH (Not Invented Here) syndrome?

We hear a lot about the failure of the TD concept and in Zaloga's book his opinion of the M18 was that it was a failure of a design. However, the M18 knocked out far more German armor then they gave and the crews loved them. The TDs had the advantage over the sherman of superior situational awareness, the ability to react to threats much faster then a crew viewing the war through periscopes. Of course they were more vulnerable to enemy fire of all types. I wonder what their loss rates were? Haven't been able to find that.

Go to the Army History sites and save your book money. The army historians not only have the facts, done the hard research, they tell it like it was, thus if you go to the horse's mouth, I mean the US Army's Mule's Mouth, you'll find the answers and the facts.

The current crop of WWII historians, get it mostly wrong. In regards to DT loses, you do not see that TD patch on any USA uniforms anymore, the units were simply disbanded as to dangerous an occupation and their heroic fighting results were not up to expectations against their staggering losses.

And I have heard this WWII "verbal history" from a MSGT TD uncle who lived long enough to become skilled at knocking out German armor and survive both WWII and Korea.

As to Italy and the M18 76mm GMC, Gen Bradley refused to deploy them with 1st Army in ETO, because the vehicle's performance turned out to be very mixed at Anzio. The high mobility vehicle was a compromised design and its primary mission of a tank destroyer, "to destroy enemy tanks", was not met.

Why the ETO US Army used Shermans:

Per the US Army: "During the First Army break through battles in (France) July and August, the 2d Armored Division tankers had learned how to fight German Panther and Tiger tanks with their M4 Shermans. They knew that the ammunition of the 75mm gun with which most of the M4's were armed (a low-velocity shell about 13 inches long, as compared with the 28- to 30-inch high-velocity shell of the Panthers) would not penetrate at any range the thick frontal armor of the Panthers and Tigers, but could damage the sides and rear.

Therefore the tankers had used wide encircling movements, engaging the enemy's attention with one platoon of tanks while another platoon attacked from the rear.

They had suffered appalling losses: between 26 July and 12 August, for example, one of 2d Armored Division's tank battalions had lost to German tanks and assault guns 51 percent of its combat personnel killed or wounded and 70 percent of its tanks destroyed or evacuated for fourth echelon repair.

But by using flanking tactics and by enlisting artillery support to fire directly on enemy tanks, the Americans had won their battles and even managed to inflict heavy losses on the Germans.

By the time the Roer offensive began, the 2d Armored Division's firepower had been stepped up to some extent. About half the division's M4's were armed with the 76mm gun. With this gun, firing the new but scarce tungsten-carbide-cored HVAP ammunition, the tankers could penetrate the front belly plate of the Panther at 300 yards and at 200 yards had a sporting chance (about one to four) of penetrating the front slope plate.

The division's tank destroyer battalion had also recently been equipped with the new M36 destroyers mounting the 90mm gun. And XIX Corps was strong in artillery support, with thirteen corps battalions of which three were allotted to the 2d Armored Division. There seemed to be no good reason why 2d Armored should not repeat the successes of its tank battles in France; that is, assuming it was not bogged down in the mud in Germany (or the terrain wouldn't allow for encirclement, my 2 cents)."

Again visit the sites for more interesting armored history.

What slowed down the fielding of 76mm Shermans in the ETO was the lack of tungsten-carbide-cored HVAP ammunition. No one had enough tungsten-carbide.

I've poured through the sites over the years. I thought the 76mm Sherman was available before the tungsten round. The ammo was reserved mostly for M10 and M18 TDs when it became available and even then I remember it amounting to only 1 round per tank per month. Hardly a significant amount.

Despite the written history and the fact that TD units no longer exist, I think the concept of the tank was sound. I base this on crew reports and the number of tanks they knocked out. What I've been trying to find is actual losses of TDs like we have for Shermans. Have you come across any?

A military numbers guy recommended this article that looks at the USA WWII 12th Army Group Tank Destroyer loss rate data (about half way through the article): http://www.usenetarticles.com/thread/810027.html

"For the time period D-Day to 20 February the average M10 strength was 696 vehicles and 439 were lost, or about 63% of the average strength, for the M18 it was average strength around 244, with 120 losses, or about 49% of the average strength. For the time period 20 September 1944 to 20 February 1945 the average M10 strength decreases to 661, with 353 losses, or around 53% of average strength, the M18 average strength increases to 302, with 108 losses or 36% of average strength. The M36 average strength is 358, with 72 losses, or around 20% of the average strength."

"For the period 20 September 1944 to 20 February 1945 the figures indicate for every 1% of M36 strength lost, 1.8% of M18 and 2.7% of M10 strength was lost. Almost, but not quite 1 to 2 to 3. While the numbers here are a guide, and certainly overestimate the M10 vulnerability, it is reasonable to assume that in fact the extra speed did keep M18 losses below M10 losses, and the 90mm gun on the M36 enabled an even lower loss figure."

With respect to your supportive TD opinions, you will not find to many troopers from any country wanting to serve (if they know up front), or many commanders endorsing fielding units that take a 63% loss or even a 20% loss and that is why the US Army said enough already with fighting the heroic and self sacrificing US tank destroyer battalions of WWII.

Enjoy, John

I scanned over the article until my eyes started bugging me. Thanks for the link, I'll print it out and read it more thoroughly later.

I remember in Cooper's book on the Sherman that they suffered losses even greater during '44. Something that equated to every tank getting knocked out 1.5x and being rebuilt before being finally destroyed, 560% comes to mind of the total number available.

A lot of our high casualties came from poor decisions from higher up due to lack of situational awareness. I remember reading one of the books about the black 761st tank battalion and how they were ordered to assault these towns in murderous fashion when if they were able to use their own tactics (based on eyes on the objective) they wouldn't have suffered anywhere near as badly.

Also TD doctrine was flawed and many lessons learned in Tunisia did not carry over initially into Italy and France, if at all. I do remember that show Tank Overhaul where they found the original TC living nearby of the M18 they were restoring and he rode that thing from Normandy to VE-Day.

If I was there then and got to pick my ride, it would be the M18. Armor so thin the rounds pass through and if it did brew up, the open top would allow everyone to egress faster! Just pray that we're used properly and not ordered to make frontal assaults but rather focus on flanking maneuvers, convoy escort and envelopments.

Here's a question I wonder about. Did Creighton Abrams take TDs with him when he operated behind enemy lines? I don't recall him mentioning that in his book.

Nice to se so many that have read`up on the TDs. After being engaged in researching the 6 TD units that were here at ft jackson and making a couple TD reunions, I have the utmost respect for those guys. They were outgunned, out armored and suffered drastic losses by commanders misusing the TDs. Too many commanders looking at the TDs regarded them as tanks and tried to use them as such. But, none of the TDs outside of the M-36B1 which had the M36 turret on the M4 chassis had any machine guns for defense and had insufficiant armor to be used as a tank. The open turret made it easier to get out,...if you survived the initial hit and explosion...but it also left the crews vulnerable to German VT fused artillery which they employed as soon as it was found they were encountering TDs. The TD concept was flawed, as it was based on late 1930's strategy to counter massed armor attacking across fields as in the attack on Poland. TDs were supposed to rush to the attack points from their reserve or stand-by positions to counter the enemy armor threat. This misconception was discussed as early as 1941 as it was seen that German tactics had changed....but our ideas didn't. TDs had both good and disasterous results, depending on where they were and euipment they had. One of the best units, the 608th TD here at Ft Jackson, had the highest target kill scores and readiness results of any TD unit, but some higher ranking idiots determined that towed guns were better than SPs and the 608th was disbanded just after they had received their M-10s and men reassigned to other TD units, which were later changed back to SPs. The fact that it took 10 men to crew a towed gun, which required unhooking from the towing vehicle and set up, as opposed to a five man crew on the M-10 which required no set up time to fire and could immediately move, was not considered. M-3 TD halftracks really took a beating in almost every front and had a very poor reputation, but in Tunisia had a good kill ratio. Most TD men complained about the TD's open turret because there was nowhere to get away from the icy wind and cold and sufferered accordingly. The TD concept and all TD units were disbanded in 1945.