DoJ Issues Guidance for Counter Drone in US
#76
Thread Starter
Now, for those that use false names etc or steal others’ info for a “false” RemoteID, then their flight profile and actions should make them easier to find and target.
It’s a combination of location relative to protected assets (Friendlies), RemoteID or not, and flight actions. All three are necessary components of a target classification, but none of them individually is sufficient - which why RemoteID is needed.
Thats your opinion. But smart folks at DHS and DoD think it’s necessary for them to do what they’ve been assigned to do, and I happen to agree. Which is why I support it.
Last edited by franklin_m; 05-08-2020 at 12:04 PM.
#77
Thread Starter
It is a combination of factors, of which valid RemoteID is just one. For example, the presence of RemoteID and a non-threatening flight path could be considered "Friendly." The absence of RemoteID would make it a "Bogey," given it is an unknown contact. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) would determine what happens next. Even with genuine IFF, I'm talking encrypted Mode IV, the absence of it does not automatically get one declared a "Bandit" or "Hostile." There's other confirmations required, as I'm sure there would be in the case of sUAS.
So presence of RemoteID does not mean you will not be engaged, for example if your sUAS is flying a profile that meets the ROE, you could be engaged regardless. However, the absence of RemoteID will make that engagement much more likely.
What about all of the traditional model airplanes, helicopters, sailplanes, etc. Relegated to FRIA's? If that was the case then the FAA during the NPRM process would have made allowance for a Remote ID solution that would be a retrofit to models NOT built as part of a "system".
But they didn't do that. Which means that even your helicopters will become illegal, unless you fly at a FRIA, and those are temporary, even by the FAA's own admission.
But they didn't do that. Which means that even your helicopters will become illegal, unless you fly at a FRIA, and those are temporary, even by the FAA's own admission.
Just as today, bad actors can steal your identity, your license plate, and a host of other things. And our system has found ways to deal with those, just as I'm sure they'll find a way to deal with cases where a bad actor steals the RemoteID information for someone's toy plane.
#78
Senior Member
Franklin, that drone interdiction outline was part of a larger report sent into the DAC last October.
It begins on page 131.
I agree that stealing someone's identity to spoof remote ID is not as simple as it sounds. What's being broadcast
and networked is the drone's serial number, which is tied to the registered owner. That is paired to whoever has
registered the app conecting to the remote ID USS, which is tied to a cell number, when the drone is flown. The
FAA is also requiring a cell number for registration.
A serial number turning up far away from where an operator normally operates would be a big red flag, as would be
anattempt to log into a USS with a phone number different from that user. It all adds up to more trouble that it's worth
for a bad actor, and another way to tie them to whatever crime they might commit.
Potentially bigger problems for legitimate users of remote ID are "electronic dragnets". In the event of a crime, the police can
and do request information from tracking app companies (Google) going back months and years for anyone in the vicinity.
Google typically sends a user a notice that Google will comply with that requset. It's up to the user to take legal action to
stop it. Numerous innocent people have been caught up just for being near a crime scene and have had to hire a lawyer.
The FAA requires USS information to be kept for 6 months. Google keeps it forever. Google also wants to register your drone:
"The FAA should permit approved Remote ID USS [Google] to facilitate the registration of UAS."
Bicylist forced to hire a lawyer after riding past crime scene:
Google’s location history data shared routinely with police:
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/201...ence-warrants/
How police might access your Lyft, Tinder and Google accounts in a criminal investigation:
https://www.deseret.com/2019/7/29/89...y-june-26-2019
Police departments are using “reverse location search warrants” to force Google to hand over data on anyone near a crime scene:
https://slate.com/technology/2019/02...le-police.html
It begins on page 131.
I agree that stealing someone's identity to spoof remote ID is not as simple as it sounds. What's being broadcast
and networked is the drone's serial number, which is tied to the registered owner. That is paired to whoever has
registered the app conecting to the remote ID USS, which is tied to a cell number, when the drone is flown. The
FAA is also requiring a cell number for registration.
A serial number turning up far away from where an operator normally operates would be a big red flag, as would be
anattempt to log into a USS with a phone number different from that user. It all adds up to more trouble that it's worth
for a bad actor, and another way to tie them to whatever crime they might commit.
Potentially bigger problems for legitimate users of remote ID are "electronic dragnets". In the event of a crime, the police can
and do request information from tracking app companies (Google) going back months and years for anyone in the vicinity.
Google typically sends a user a notice that Google will comply with that requset. It's up to the user to take legal action to
stop it. Numerous innocent people have been caught up just for being near a crime scene and have had to hire a lawyer.
The FAA requires USS information to be kept for 6 months. Google keeps it forever. Google also wants to register your drone:
"The FAA should permit approved Remote ID USS [Google] to facilitate the registration of UAS."
Bicylist forced to hire a lawyer after riding past crime scene:
Google’s location history data shared routinely with police:
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/201...ence-warrants/
How police might access your Lyft, Tinder and Google accounts in a criminal investigation:
https://www.deseret.com/2019/7/29/89...y-june-26-2019
Police departments are using “reverse location search warrants” to force Google to hand over data on anyone near a crime scene:
https://slate.com/technology/2019/02...le-police.html
Last edited by ECHO24; 05-10-2020 at 05:01 AM.
#79
Senior Member
Maybe it was too many links in a post. This is the first article,
Bicylist forced to hire a lawyer after riding past crime scene
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news...e-him-n1151761
A search of the other phrases brings up the article and dozens more on the subject of geofence warrants.
Bicylist forced to hire a lawyer after riding past crime scene
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news...e-him-n1151761
A search of the other phrases brings up the article and dozens more on the subject of geofence warrants.
#80
My Feedback: (11)
Fascinating.
Cell phone ping data is nothing new but as much as I watch discovery ID while I'm working from home, I admit I never heard of that.
Though I think he went too far, if they didn't have corroborating evidence like maybe using that to get a warrant for prints or DNA, I doubt the fact he rode past the house would have been sufficient to get him charged with anything.
Cell phone ping data is nothing new but as much as I watch discovery ID while I'm working from home, I admit I never heard of that.
Though I think he went too far, if they didn't have corroborating evidence like maybe using that to get a warrant for prints or DNA, I doubt the fact he rode past the house would have been sufficient to get him charged with anything.
#82
Senior Member
Police Executive Research Forum. 2020.
Drones: A Report on the Use of Drones by Public Safety Agencies—and a Wake-Up Call about the
Threat of Malicious Drone Attacks. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
One reason for the push for remote ID is local police cannot use radio frequncies to detect drones. They can
only use non-RF detection. Brendan Groves, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General at the DOJ,
"the federal Pen/Trap Act prohibits the interception of noncontent information associated with electronic
communications. If you imagine RF signals as a letter, non-content information would be the information
on the outside of the envelope: the addresses of the sender and recipient. Violations of the Pen/Trap Act
are serious and may give rise to criminal and civil liability."
Drones: A Report on the Use of Drones by Public Safety Agencies—and a Wake-Up Call about the
Threat of Malicious Drone Attacks. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
One reason for the push for remote ID is local police cannot use radio frequncies to detect drones. They can
only use non-RF detection. Brendan Groves, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General at the DOJ,
"the federal Pen/Trap Act prohibits the interception of noncontent information associated with electronic
communications. If you imagine RF signals as a letter, non-content information would be the information
on the outside of the envelope: the addresses of the sender and recipient. Violations of the Pen/Trap Act
are serious and may give rise to criminal and civil liability."
#83
Police Executive Research Forum. 2020.
Drones: A Report on the Use of Drones by Public Safety Agencies—and a Wake-Up Call about the
Threat of Malicious Drone Attacks. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
One reason for the push for remote ID is local police cannot use radio frequncies to detect drones. They can
only use non-RF detection. Brendan Groves, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General at the DOJ,
"the federal Pen/Trap Act prohibits the interception of noncontent information associated with electronic
communications. If you imagine RF signals as a letter, non-content information would be the information
on the outside of the envelope: the addresses of the sender and recipient. Violations of the Pen/Trap Act
are serious and may give rise to criminal and civil liability."
Drones: A Report on the Use of Drones by Public Safety Agencies—and a Wake-Up Call about the
Threat of Malicious Drone Attacks. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
One reason for the push for remote ID is local police cannot use radio frequncies to detect drones. They can
only use non-RF detection. Brendan Groves, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General at the DOJ,
"the federal Pen/Trap Act prohibits the interception of noncontent information associated with electronic
communications. If you imagine RF signals as a letter, non-content information would be the information
on the outside of the envelope: the addresses of the sender and recipient. Violations of the Pen/Trap Act
are serious and may give rise to criminal and civil liability."
In fact I'd suggest it'd have no effect at all. A total waste of time.
R_Strowe
#84
My Feedback: (29)
I agree. RID will do nothing to deter terrorism via UAS. What RID will do is make the guy who flies his MR over the approach of an airport easier to find thus finding him faster will get aircraft back in the air faster. More importantly it will give our media dependent society the warm and fuzzies.
#85
Senior Member
Interestingly enough, the report also states that an sUAS without RID would also be very difficult to detect, and therefore either local or federal LE would have a very difficult time doing anything about such a craft in time to affect the operator's mission. Which is what so many of us have been saying for so long; That Remote ID will not stop or hinder someone who is hell bent on bad acts.
In fact I'd suggest it'd have no effect at all. A total waste of time.
R_Strowe
In fact I'd suggest it'd have no effect at all. A total waste of time.
R_Strowe
narrowing down the workload of safety officials responsible for protecting utilities, concerts, sports venues, etc.
#86
My Feedback: (29)
I beg to differ. In most cases without RID nobody knows the UAS is even there. With RID, every UAS in the vicinity of the event will need to be checked out at least electronically. RID is going to require infrastructure and people to maintain that infrastructure. It's going to need qualified instructors to train people to correctly access the data. It's going to cost the US taxpayers millions to implement and will do virtually nothing to deter terrorism.
#89
Something no one has really mentioned but a few have hinted at is that pretty much all quads and, for that matter, conventional R/C planes don't show up on radar. Since wood, FG and plastic are not RF reflective and radar works by seeing reflected RF energy, all that could show up would be the motors and maybe landing gear. If you compare a quarter scale Mustang to a full sized F-22 Raptor, as seen on radar, the Raptor is virtually invisible but, by comparison, the Mustang would be undetectable at anything beyond point blank range WITHOUT having stealth characteristics
#90
Thread Starter
"The FAA anticipates that the Remote ID USS would recoup the costs of providing services either through the sale of subscriptions for remote identification services, on-line advertising, or 'value added' services that can be purchased from the service provider (emphasis added)." - Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 250, page 72508 of NPRM
#91
Thread Starter
I beg to differ. In most cases without RID nobody knows the UAS is even there. With RID, every UAS in the vicinity of the event will need to be checked out at least electronically. RID is going to require infrastructure and people to maintain that infrastructure. It's going to need qualified instructors to train people to correctly access the data. It's going to cost the US taxpayers millions to implement and will do virtually nothing to deter terrorism (emphasis added).
#92
Just because the FAA ANTICIPATES something doesn't mean it's actually going to happen. That's like saying that just because you anticipate warm and sunny conditions going over a mountain pass means you won't have to worry about getting caught in a snow shower(or worse). For example, the wife and I went to Little Rock Arkansas in June of 2014. We had been driving in 80+ degrees for two days when we stopped in Evanston Wyoming for the night. We had only just arrived in town when we ran into a snow shower. Ended up literally sliding into an intersection due to slushy conditions. The weather forecasts called for hot and sunny the whole trip, so we didn't anticipate bad weather and were caught totally flat footed
Last edited by Hydro Junkie; 05-14-2020 at 02:05 AM.
#93
Thread Starter
"Remote ID means that law enforcement agents can immediately be alerted electronically to the presence of a particular drone so they can read the electronic “signature” of the drone and receive certain information—for example, the name and identity of the operator. This will help the law enforcement agents distinguish drones properly registered under Remote ID as belonging to hobbyists from drones that are potential threats operated by criminals. If a drone approaches the event without this automatic identification system, it will alert the agents that the drone is not registered, which can be considered a factor in determining whether the drone constitutes a threat. (emphasis added)" - pg. 64, Police Executive Research Forum. 2020. Drones: A Report on the Use of Drones by Public Safety Agencies—and a Wake-Up Call about the Threat of Malicious Drone Attacks. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
DHS, DoD, LE, FAA, and intel community have, I think, a lot better understanding of what effect it will have. Based on the effort they're putting into this, it would appear they have a different opinion. Given their expertise in the air defense problem, technologies on both sides of the problem, and access to information not available to the general public, I think they have a much better idea of whether it is a waste of time or not. Which is why I support their efforts.
Last edited by franklin_m; 05-14-2020 at 04:32 AM.
#94
My Feedback: (29)
Just because the FAA ANTICIPATES something doesn't mean it's actually going to happen. That's like saying that just because you anticipate warm and sunny conditions going over a mountain pass means you won't have to worry about getting caught in a snow shower(or worse). For example, the wife and I went to Little Rock Arkansas in June of 2014. We had been driving in 80+ degrees for two days when we stopped in Evanston Wyoming for the night. We had only just arrived in town when we ran into a snow shower. Ended up literally sliding into an intersection due to slushy conditions. The weather forecasts called for hot and sunny the whole trip, so we didn't anticipate bad weather and were caught totally flat footed
I know right? Shall we talk about the " anticipated " budget for the F-22, F-35 or maybe even the California Bullet Train? All brought to you by Congress and the panel of " Expert " yes men.
#95
Thread Starter
And yet, you don't hold your beloved AMA, and the EC "Experts" managing the organization, accountable for their failures that have resulted in budget deficits, two decades of declining membership, losses on legislative and regulatory front, imposition of operational limits (400 ft etc.), etc. etc.
#97
Senior Member
value of subscriptions is $192M to $242M. Those 8 USS providers are developing the app based on that.
Again, remote ID allows a drone operating legitimately to be quickly eliminated as a threat using just a smart phone.
This is what you're trying to second-guess (Senior Vice President for Security for the NFL),
"Some drones can travel at more than 100 miles per hour, so we might only have three to five minutes to react and
disable the drone. We have hundreds of thousands of people in all these open areas and heavy queue lines. There is
no protective measure I can take in just a few minutes. For example, would it make sense to open all the doors and
pull people inside the stadium? That might just scare people and cause a stampede.
Even disseminating word about the threat to all of the police and security people would be impossible in three to five
minutes. We had dozens of police departments involved, 25 different federal law enforcement agencies, and 6,000
private security guards from four different companies. How are we going to communicate that we’ve got a threat arriving
in three to five minutes? There were four different radio systems with 14 to 16 different radio channels being used at any
given time. We had 13 different command centers operating at the Super Bowl, so which command center gets the word?"
Last edited by ECHO24; 05-14-2020 at 07:20 AM.
#98
So maybe I'm over simplifying things here but, in many, if not most, sensitive areas where a threat would need to be detected, RID or not, restrictions on the airspace should be enough. For example, there shouldn't be ANY drones (properly RID equipped or otherwise) flying over an NFL stadium during a sports event there. Likewise around electric power plants, dams, prisons, airports etc. I would think that for the high risk locations, RID really wouldn't be much of a determining factor one way or the other. NO sUAS should be flying there, so any UAS flying in these areas need to be dealt with appropriately.
#99
Thread Starter
Wins? Are you talking about 336 that didn't survive the first reauthorization or 349 that codified in law the hard limits for the first time? Or are your "wins" select carve outs, and then only in a small handful of specific locations, to get back what some argue you had before?
Last edited by franklin_m; 05-14-2020 at 07:32 AM.
#100
My Feedback: (29)
And yet, you don't hold your beloved AMA, and the EC "Experts" managing the organization, accountable for their failures that have resulted in budget deficits, two decades of declining membership, losses on legislative and regulatory front, imposition of operational limits (400 ft etc.), etc. etc.